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JIM ROSSI** & MICHAEL PANFIL***
This Article presents a historical, evidentiary, and normative case for a private
negligence tort against public utilities for failure to adjust operational and
planning decisions to new conditions brought about by climate change. As an
extension of the traditional utility duty to serve, the tort duty to adapt includes
obligations of reasonable notice of service interruption, avoidance of unnecessary
power outages, and updating technologically available standards in operations
and planning to encompass the foreseeable risks of climate change. Modern
examples of extreme weather service outages, hurricanes, and wildfires are
surveyed to demonstrate an evidentiary basis for judicial recognition of a tort
duty for public utilities to take reasonable safety precautions to reduce adaptation
risks. A private law duty to adapt for public utilities complements existing
regulation in addressing rapidly emerging risks presented by climate change.
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INTRODUCTION
To date, climate tort litigation brought against energy infrastructure firms
has focused primarily on mitigating a defendant’s specific contributions to
climate change.1 Claims “that greenhouse gas emissions constitute an actionable
tort under federal or state law”2 raise complex legal issues and have
understandably been the subject of significant scholarship.3 Less explored is the

1. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 423–24 (2011) (dismissing a public
nuisance lawsuit seeking imposition of caps on and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from power
companies on the ground that the Clean Air Act displaced federal common law claims); Native Village
of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissing an action by Alaska
Natives seeking damages from oil and power companies for the impacts of climate change on their
village on the grounds that state common law was displaced by the Clean Air Act); Complaint at 1,
Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Chevron Corp., No. 18-cv-07477 (N.D. Cal. filed Nov. 14,
2018 in Cal. Super. Ct. as No. 18-571285) (pending action by a commercial fishing industry trade group
to hold fossil fuel companies liable for adverse climate change impacts to the ocean off the coasts of
California and Oregon which resulted in prolonged closures of Dungeness crab fisheries); Opinion and
Order at 1–2, Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., No. 18-cv-00395 (D.R.I. filed July 2, 2018 in R.I. Super.
Ct. as No. PC-2018-4716) (remand order pending before 1st Cir.) (seeking to hold fossil fuel companies
liable for causing climate change impacts that adversely affect Rhode Island and jeopardize state-owned
or -operated facilities, real property, and other assets).
2. Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENV’T L. 1, 2 (2011).
3. See generally Randall S. Abate, Automobile Emissions and Climate Change Impacts: Employing
Public Nuisance Doctrine as Part of a “Global Warming Solution” in California, 40 CONN. L. REV. 591
(2008); Timothy D. Lytton, Using Tort Litigation To Enhance Regulatory Policy Making: Evaluating
Climate-Change Litigation in Light of Lessons from Gun-Industry and Clergy-Sexual-Abuse Lawsuits, 86 TEX.
L. REV. 1837 (2008); Shi-Ling Hsu, A Realistic Evaluation of Climate Change Litigation Through the Lens
of a Hypothetical Lawsuit, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 701 (2008); Jonathan Zasloff, The Judicial Carbon Tax:
Reconstructing Public Nuisance and Climate Change, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1827 (2008); David Hunter &
James Salzman, Negligence in the Air: The Duty of Care in Climate Change Litigation, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
1741 (2007) [hereinafter Hunter & Salzman, Negligence in the Air]; Myles Allen, Pardeep Pall, Daithi
Stone, Peter Stott, David Frame, Seung-Ki Min, Toru Nozawa & Seiji Yukimoto, Scientific Challenges
in the Attribution of Harm to Human Influence on Climate, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1353 (2007) [hereinafter
Allen et al., Scientific Challenges]; Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM.
J. ENV’T L. 293 (2005); Myles R. Allen & Richard Lord, The Blame Game: Who Will Pay for the
Damaging Consequences of Climate Change?, 432 NATURE 551 (2004); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Acts of God
or Toxic Torts? Applying Tort Principles to the Problem of Climate Change, 38 NAT. RES. J. 563 (1998). For
a collection of essays exploring the implications of climate change litigation in a variety of contexts
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question of an energy service provider’s obligations to address the adverse
impacts of climate change.4 That is, does an energy service provider have a
negligence-based duty to adapt its operations, planning, and investments to new
risks created by climate change? And if so, what are the implications of that
duty?
Climate change impacts society in profound ways. Its consequences
include population displacement, food insecurity, and health and economic
harms associated with flooding and extreme weather, among other things.5
Some of the most visible harms associated with climate change, such as injuries
to persons or property due to fires or flooding, flow directly from the operation
of energy infrastructure during extreme weather events. Climate adaptation, or
the “adjustment in natural or human systems in anticipation of or response to a
changing environment,” requires investment in new measures aimed at
promoting a more resilient energy system.6
Litigation surrounding climate adaptation risks in the U.S. energy
industry is already underway. A number of cases alleging negligence have been
filed in Texas following multiple extended power outages associated with 2021’s
Winter Storm Uri.7 Massive and widespread harms associated with wildfires in
California have given rise to private tort claims for losses resulting from risks
associated with subpar safety engineering in the operation of a utility’s
infrastructure.8 Other cases seek to establish statutory and common law tort
liability for oil and gas corporations, public utilities, engineering companies,
both tort and nontort, see generally ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND
INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES (William C.G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky eds., 2009).
4. But see Jacqueline Peel & Hari M. Osofsky, Sue To Adapt?, 99 MINN. L. REV. 2177, 2235–49
(2015) (drawing lessons for the United States from adaptation litigation in Australia, including tort
claims seeking compensation for harms from wildfires).
5. See THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL
ASPECTS 3–8 (Michael B. Gerrard & Katrina Fischer Kuh eds., 2012) (explaining that “adaptation”
describes “efforts to moderate, cope with, and prepare for the current and anticipated impacts of climate
change on human and natural systems”). Resilience is a “closely related concept” that describes “the
capability to anticipate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from climate impacts.” Id. at 3.
6. Exec. Order No. 13653, 78 Fed. Reg. 66819, 66824 (Nov. 6, 2013); see also Glossary, U.S.
GLOB. CHANGE RSCH. PROGRAM, https://www.globalchange.gov/climate-change/glossary [https://
perma.cc/A8RU-7TXW].
7. See, e.g., Katy Boose, Round-Up of Texas Winter Storm Lawsuits, LEGAL EXAM’R (Mar. 19,
2021), https://www.legalexaminer.com/legal/round-up-of-texas-winter-storm-lawsuits/ [https://perma
.cc/6PGE-Y452]; see also Plaintiff’s Original Petition and Application for Temporary Injunction and
Permanent Injunction at 11–13, CPS Energy v. Elec. Reliability Council of Tex., No. 2021CI04574
(Tex. Dist. Ct. 2021) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Petition and Application], https://www.cpsenergy.com/
content/dam/corporate/en/Documents/2021-03-12%20CPS%20Energy%20Original%20Petition%20w
%20Ex%20A(117202625_1).PDF [https://perma.cc/M6U8-5AZ5].
8. See, e.g., California Wildfire Victims Sue Utility PG&E Alleging Negligence, REUTERS (Nov. 14,
2018, 9:09 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-california-wildfires-lawsuit/california-wildfirevictims-sue-utility-pge-alleging-negligence-idUSKCN1NJ20G [https://perma.cc/3KED-EDNE].
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real estate professionals, and developers based on a failure to appropriately
respond to foreseeable climate risks.9 At the same time, public utility regulation
is increasingly requiring electric utilities to proactively plan for resilience risks
in operating and planning for energy infrastructure.10
A negligence-based climate adaptation tort aims to remedy a
fundamentally different kind of harm from tort lawsuits seeking compensation
for a defendant’s contributions to climate change. An adaptation tort also does
not raise the complex causation issues that plague current climate change
mitigation tort suits.11 As important, a climate adaptation tort provides a
mechanism for adjudicating a different kind of misconduct: an entity’s
negligence in failing to make operational and planning decisions in a manner
that accounts for changing conditions in light of climate change.
This raises an important question for tort and regulatory law in the energy
sector. Namely, when can a utility or other energy provider be sued in tort, not
for its present or past activities that contribute to climate change, but for failure
to operate, plan, or invest in energy infrastructure in a manner that accounts for
the consequences of climate change?12 Embedded here are questions of whether
climate science imparts sufficient specificity and foresight to allow actors to take
feasible advance measures to beneficially modify operations and more wisely
invest in and allocate resources to address climate adaptation risks.
A private tort to hold public utilities accountable for climate-adaptation
risks has strong historical, evidentiary, and normative foundations. This Article
charts a pathway for recognition of such a claim as an extension of the public
utility’s traditional “duty to serve.”13 This longstanding common law obligation,
9. See DEANNA MORAN & ELENA MIHALY, CONSERVATION L. FOUND., CLIMATE
ADAPTION AND LIABILITY: A LEGAL PRIMER AND WORKSHOP SUMMARY REPORT 7–17 (2018),
https://www.clf.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/GRC_CLF_Report_R8.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8T
D-ENBV] (discussing potential contract and tort liability of real estate and design professionals).
10. See ROMANY M. WEBB, MICHAEL PANFIL & SARAH LADIN, CLIMATE RISK IN THE
ELECTRICITY SECTOR: LEGAL OBLIGATIONS TO ADVANCE CLIMATE RESILIENCE PLANNING BY
ELECTRIC UTILITIES 27–38 (2020), https://climate.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/Full
%20Report%20-%20Climate%20Risk%20in%20the%20Electricity%20Sector%20-%20Webb%20et%20
al_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/246X-7SPL].
11. For discussion of the causation challenges in nuisance and other legal claims against the energy
sector for causing the adverse effects of climate change, see generally Allen et al., Scientific Challenges,
supra note 3.
12. Unlike climate change mitigation tort ligation, which typically requires some factual finding
of a defendant’s causal attribution to climate change, tort claims focused on adaptation harms do not
require a court to make a finding that a defendant has caused climate change or a specific harm that is
causally attributed to climate change—only that the utility’s operations or planning in relation to the
consequences of climate change have directly caused physical or economic harm to specific victims.
13. Other duties may additionally be relevant to this inquiry, such as statutory obligations
implicated by climate adaptation risks. See, e.g., Conservation L. Found., Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 3
F.4th 61, 70 (1st Cir. 2021) (alleging violations of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and
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conferred upon businesses engaged in the provision of utility services, provides
a solid basis for judicial recognition of a tort claim to respond to the ongoing
adaptation risks associated with the energy grid, which we term the “duty to
adapt.” We show that judicial recognition of a private duty to adapt for energy
providers is consistent with the principles of both tort and utility law and
discuss its challenges and limits.
As every first-year law student learns, a prima facie case of negligence has
four basic elements: duty, breach, causation, and damages.14 This Article focuses
on the duty element of a negligence-based tort and its implications for climate
change litigation against public utilities and, in certain applications, energy grid
operators.15 A public utility “duty to serve” already plays a foundational role in
defining the obligations of many energy companies, typically requiring an
electric or natural gas utility to provide continued, adequate service to its
customers.16 As a general matter, regulators (not courts) oversee the basic
reliability floor for utility services. But, as we discuss in this Article, the duty
to serve is still sometimes implicated by courts as a common law remedy where
a customer suffers harm because service is interrupted or fails. Private tort
remedies for negligence (or, at the very least, gross negligence)17 based on an
Clean Water Act in failing to prepare a marine terminal for climate change impacts); Conservation L.
Found., Inc. v. Shell Oil Prods. U.S., No. 17-cv-00396, 2020 WL 5775874, at *1 (D.R.I. Sept. 28,
2020) (alleging a violation of the Clean Water Act in failing to prepare a bulk-fuel-storage facility for
climate change impacts). There may also be common law duties related to contract and property law,
such as the public trust doctrine. See generally Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: The
Potential Role of State Common-Law Public Trust Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV. 781 (2010) (describing how
the public trust doctrine is well suited to provide legal support for climate adaptation regimes in the
area of water law). Additionally, an actor’s obligations owed under a general duty of care in tort may
be relevant, which we discuss in relation to the duty to adapt expressed more fully in Part III.
14. See W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164–65 (5th ed. 1984).
15. We use the term “energy grid operators” generically to include transmission grid operators,
regulated electric utilities (sometimes referred to as “load serving entities”), and upstream energy
suppliers (such as power generators) that are not regulated utilities. We enunciate a duty to adapt that,
as premised on a duty to serve, specifically considers obligations owed by public utilities. However, at
various times and circumstances, obligations may apply to other energy grid operators based on the
duty of care, as described in Part III. In such instances, much of the foreseeability analysis presented
in Section II.C would apply. Similarly, depending upon commercial arrangements and the extent to
which regulatory tariff requirements apply, defendants may have potential defenses to duty-to-adapt
claims, as is discussed in Section III.B.
16. Although our focus here is on energy utilities, the duty to serve is similarly foundational for
other public utilities, such as water or sewer utilities. A duty to adapt may apply in those sectors for
the same reasons and may raise similar legal issues.
17. Historically, utilities have been shielded from liability for temporary interruption or outages
in emergencies or due to forces beyond their control. See infra Section III.B.1. As we discuss in Section
III.B.1, however, defenses based on acts of God do not (or should not) apply broadly to foreseeable
climate adaptation harms. Some states may similarly limit liability where the damage caused by severe
weather is unpreventable.
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energy utility’s duty to adapt derive from and help to reinforce the traditional
duty to serve. A duty to adapt is consistent with the normative foundations of
both tort and regulation and can help to inform the analysis of defenses to
private claims against regulated utilities.
In Part I, we discuss the history of the utility duty to serve and highlight
its dual common law and regulatory origins. The duty to serve sits at the
intersection of private law (namely, contract and tort) and modern utility
regulation. We present a basic typology of the duty’s constituent obligations,
based on the traditional harms it is designed to protect against and the remedies
and enforcement it provides. We identify three distinct obligations that courts
have historically recognized as a basis for private tort enforcement against
utilities: (1) a duty to provide reasonable notice to customers before service
interruption; (2) a duty to ensure adequate and safe service; and (3) a duty to
meet technical operational standards.
In Part II, we present an evidentiary argument supporting judicial
recognition of an ongoing private tort duty to adapt as an extension of the
traditional duty to serve. In their operations and planning, private energy grid
operators today increasingly confront foreseeable risks associated with climate
change that require different actions than business as normal would otherwise
dictate. As recent weather-related disruptions to the energy sector demonstrate,
climate change shifts the frequency and severity of historically low-probability,
high-impact events that can impact the energy grid. This underscores a need
not only to focus on the traditional reliability objectives that regulators and
courts have built into the duty to serve but also to be attentive to grid
resilience.18
Examples of recent climate-amplified weather events that have caused
significant physical or economic harm to victims demonstrate how the energy
industry has knowledge of climate-induced risks, as well as of feasible responses
to them. At minimum, and as the 2021 winter storm power outages in Texas
illustrate, where a customer suffers harm due to a prolonged loss of service from
an extreme weather event, a utility’s obligation to provide reasonable notice of
service affords a straightforward basis for a court to adjudicate private tort
liability for an ongoing failure to adapt. Customer notice claims may be low18. Although climate change is emblematic of emerging energy resilience challenges, it is not the
only example. Cybersecurity concerns similarly pose low-probability, high-impact harms to the energy
sector and present a rapidly shifting risk profile. See generally DOE Announces Cybersecurity Programs for
Enhancing Safety and Resilience of U.S. Energy Sector, DEP’T ENERGY (Mar. 18, 2021), http://www.
energy.gov/article/doe-announces-cybersecurity-programs-enhancing-safety-and-resilience-us-energy
-sector [https://perma.cc/QF2F-5N4Z]. The duty to serve may similarly be relevant to such concerns,
though the analysis of tort liability is also more complicated due to an intervening intentional
tortfeasor.
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hanging fruit, as they do not require a substantial investment by a defendant to
meet the expectations of the duty to adapt. But we also show that an energy
utility’s discharge of the duty to adapt can go beyond customer notice. The duty
to serve’s requirement to provide adequate service can also be extended to
include adaptation planning by the utility for foreseeable risks of harm, such as
the devastating personal and property losses produced by wildfires in California
in 2017 and 2018.19 Regulators in several states have recognized these
obligations, and courts have likewise been willing to impose private liability for
damage caused by severe weather where the harm is foreseeable and
preventable, suggesting a utility obligation to properly plan and prepare for
shifts in demand that will place a strain on the grid. These examples
demonstrate the modern evidentiary foundation for recognition of a duty to
adapt, extending the traditional duty to serve to obligate public utilities to make
operational and planning decisions in a manner that accounts for changing
conditions in light of climate change.
A duty to adapt raises important questions about whether it is a good idea
for adaptation risks to be remedied by private law rather than regulation. In
Part III, we discuss why, as a normative matter, judicial recognition of a private
duty to adapt for energy grid operators advances the functions of both tort and
regulatory law. Recent climate-related events present an enormous challenge
for the energy industry. Going forward, extensive regulatory responses will be
necessary to address the harms of climate adaptation. But existing regulation
alone is insufficient to address climate adaptation risks. Utility regulation is
notoriously slow and clunky in recognizing new forms of risks and in promoting
new technologies—especially to the extent that many utilities remain
substantially invested in expensive (and increasingly obsolete) legacy power
plants and transmission lines. Common law remedies, such as the duty to adapt,
have an important role to play in addressing the challenges of climate change,
while advancing the goals of both tort and regulatory law. Like the common law
duty to serve, the duty to adapt allows courts to impose a flexible obligation on
utility grid operators that reflects expectations for energy service, while also
providing a remedy for risks that cause harm. Over time, the obligations of the
duty to adapt may, like the duty to serve, ultimately be incorporated into
regulation.20 In this sense, the duty to adapt can help to improve utility
19. As is discussed in Section II.B, California law has allowed recovery for these impacts under a
strict liability standard, whereas in other jurisdictions these kinds of harms would typically be
adjudicated as negligence cases.
20. To the extent that jurisdictional and institutional obstacles can be overcome, for example,
foundational ratemaking principles could serve as a firm basis for incorporating climate adaptation
through regulation actions. See, e.g., Jonas J. Monast, Precautionary Ratemaking, 69 UCLA L. REV.
(forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 5) (on file with authors) (arguing that utility ratemaking should
shift from a focus on “least cost” to “least cost-least risk,” based on the precautionary principle).
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regulation by providing stronger incentives for energy grid operators to
proactively reduce adaptation risks and to address grid resilience.
To be clear, we are not arguing that strict liability should apply to harms
attributed to energy infrastructure because of climate change, or that utilities
are obligated to insure against all such harms. Rather, our argument is for a
form of traditional negligence-based liability as an extension (and modification)
of the traditional duty to serve. On this basis, we believe that the common law
foundations of the duty to serve support a private law duty that, like other tort
obligations, can be defined (and limited) by a reasonably identifiable zone of
risk of harm to foreseeable victims. Tort defenses still may play a role, but
courts applying defenses to such claims should consider guideposts that fit with
the functional goals of the duty to adapt.
We conclude that, while a private duty to adapt is not a panacea to the
energy grid’s adaptation risks, it is an essential piece to the puzzle of addressing
the harms of climate change.
I. THE UTILITY’S DUTY TO SERVE
Over the past 150 years, courts and regulators have frequently invoked the
“duty to serve” to define the floor for the provision of service by public utilities.
The duty to serve has informed responses to the “grimmest imaginable”
economic and social problems, including poverty, racial discrimination, and
economic inequality.21 And it is difficult to imagine what modern public utility
regulation would look like without a duty to serve.22
Inevitably, there is jurisdictional variation in the specific requirements of
the duty to serve. However, the duty encompasses some common obligations
related to the provision of adequate service. Importantly too, the duty to serve
has a common law foundation, allowing courts to enforce obligations
independent of statutes and regulations.23 It is typically “imposed upon the
public service corporation because it is organized to do business affected with a
21. For a good survey of the duty to serve’s historical significance, see CHARLES M. HAAR &
DANIEL WM. FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE OF THE TRACKS: A REVOLUTIONARY REDISCOVERY
OF THE COMMON LAW TRADITION OF FAIRNESS IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST INEQUALITY 15
(1986) (“Over the centuries, the common law doctrine of equal services and the duty to serve surfaced
and resurfaced as a potent and dynamic means to address changing—and often the grimmest
imaginable—social and economic conditions.”).
22. An unsigned but oft-cited Columbia Law Review Note calls the duty to provide adequate
service the “primary duty” of the public utility. Note, The Duty of a Public Utility To Render Adequate
Service: Its Scope and Enforcement, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 312, 312 (1962) [hereinafter The Duty of a Public
Utility].
23. Messer v. S. Airways Sales Co., 17 So. 2d 679, 681–82 (Ala. 1944) (“This duty to serve the
public exists independent of statutes regulating the manner in which public service corporations or
companies shall do business. . . . This obligation to serve the public also arises independent of contract
with the municipality in the shape of a franchise, or of a contract with the individual.”).
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public interest, and because the corporation has held itself out to the public as
being willing to serve all members thereof.”24
The private law foundations of the duty to serve include both contract and
tort law. For a utility customer who has a contract to purchase energy, the duty
to serve can inform the terms of service that the utility is expected to provide
as a seller and the customer’s rights as a purchaser. But courts have long
recognized that the duty to serve creates private obligations independent of
contract—especially where the terms of service are not spelled out in explicit
contractual terms.25 These can range from the requirement to provide a
customer reasonable notice prior to service shutoff to obligations to
noncustomers who are harmed when a utility discontinues service.
After describing these historical foundations, this part presents a typology
to isolate the basic obligations of the duty to serve and their significance in
approaching modern problems associated with utility infrastructure. The duty
to serve is distinct from other regulatory requirements relevant to utility
operation, namely price regulation and open-access requirements. And each of
the basic obligations in the typology not only encompass regulatory
requirements, but can also support private tort obligations for utilities.
A.

Historical Foundations

Modern understandings of public utility regulation trace their political
and legal origins to the late nineteenth century, but the common law principles
behind the idea of the public utility stretch back several centuries. In Munn v.
Illinois,26 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld state price regulation of grain
elevators.27 The Court took inspiration from Lord Mathew Hale’s notion that a
business “affected with a public interest” requires special regulatory attention.28
“Every ferry,” Lord Hale wrote in the seventeenth century, “ought to be under
public regulation; [to wit] that it give attendance at due times, keep a boat in
due order, and take but reasonable toll.”29 Early in the twentieth century,
American reformers such as John Commons drafted state laws granting
monopoly franchises to electric and natural gas utilities, subjecting them to

24. Id. at 681. The historical foundations of the duty to serve arguably make it a “fundamental
principle from which all the rules of public service may be derived.” Id. at 682.
25. Id.
26. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
27. Id. at 154.
28. See id. at 127; see also Walton H. Hamilton, Affectation with Public Interest, 39 YALE L.J. 1089,
1092–99 (1930) (discussing the history of Lord Hale’s phrase and its adoption by the Court in Munn).
29. MATHEW HALE, De Jure Maris et Brachiorum Ejusdem, in A TREATISE, IN THREE PARTS,
reprinted in 1 A COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND FROM
MANUSCRIPTS 5, 6 (Francis Hargrave ed., 1787).
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price regulation and customer service obligations (a precursor to the duty to
serve and modern notions of “universal service”).30
New Deal reformers embraced the public utility as a progressive
institution aimed at promoting fairness and addressing economic inequality.31
At the same time, the argument that natural monopoly regulation is necessary
to promote economic efficiency and consumer welfare served as an intellectual
anchor for economic regulation of water and sewage services, railroads, airlines,
trucking, natural gas, electric power, and telecommunications.32 All of these
industries experimented with various forms of the duty to serve and customer
service obligations, establishing a fairly consistent set of tasks for regulators
across various public utility industries.33 Though there has been almost
consistent criticism of public utility regulation34 and regular calls for
restructuring of utility services,35 for the most part the idea of the public utility
and related legal doctrines (including the duty to serve) have proved durable.
In recent years, public utility regulation has experienced a new
renaissance. Even with competition in formerly regulated industries, such as
telecommunications and energy, it is recognized that public utility regulation
30. See William J. Novak, The Public Utility Idea and the Origins of Modern Business Regulation, in
CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 139, 140 (Naomi R. Lamoreauex & William J. Novak
eds., 2017).
31. Id. at 139–40; see also HAAR & FESSLER, supra note 21, at 15–18, 247.
32. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Technology, Politics and Regulated Monopoly: An American Historical
Perspective, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1263, 1263 (1984).
33. Often, the public utility has been theorized as a form of incomplete contract, offering financial
stability to the regulated firm (primarily, by helping to lower its costs of capital) while also protecting
consumers from various abuses associated with monopoly. George L. Priest, The Origins of Utility
Regulation and the “Theories of Regulation” Debate, 36 J.L. & ECON. 289, 301–13 (1993).
34. Harold Demsetz began to question the logic of traditional economic regulation in the 1960s.
See generally Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55 (1968). Public choice theory
and the Chicago School rose to prominence in its critique of industry regulation during the 1970s. See
generally George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971);
Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976). Many
economists celebrated the allocative efficiency of competitive markets, calling into question the core
features of public utility regulation and natural monopoly regulation. See Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel
H. Cole, Introduction to The End of a Natural Monopoly: Deregulation and Competition in the Electric Power
Industry, in 7 THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS 3–6 (Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H.
Cole eds., 2003).
35. Calls for deregulation of electric power reached a crescendo in the 1990s. See, e.g., Peter
Navarro, Electric Utilities: The Argument for Radical Deregulation, HARV. BUS. REV., https://hbr.org/
1996/01/electric-utilities-the-argument-for-radical-deregulation [https://perma.cc/J73K-GQ57 (dark
archive)]. While the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) has restructured wholesale
electric power supply markets and some states (such as Texas) have restructured some aspects of retail
power supply, controversy over the effectiveness of energy markets has continued for more than a
quarter of a century. See Richard Cudahy, The Folklore of Deregulation (with Apologies to Thurman Arnold),
15 YALE J. ON REGUL. 427, 436–38 (1998); David B. Spence, Naïve Energy Markets, 92 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 973, 988 (2017).
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remains relevant.36 With the proliferation of modern “network” industries, the
idea of the public utility is being invoked as a way of addressing new problems
associated with private control of infrastructure. Concerns about network
efficiency and the ownership and control of important information are giving
rise to new calls for the extension of regulation, especially in confronting
economic concerns with the modern information economy.37 Regulators (and
sometimes courts) are being called on to extend features of public utility
regulation into new frontiers, including net neutrality,38 certain aspects of
environmental regulation,39 and health care.40 This makes it a propitious time
to revisit the scope and content of the duty to serve and what it requires of
public utilities, especially for industries in the energy sector facing the new
challenge of responding to climate change.
One important question is whether liability for service interruptions can
ever extend beyond the traditional utility. Increased competition in power
supply has resulted in the emergence of new private actors in the energy sector,
including wholesale merchant power generators (which sell energy to loadserving utilities in upstream wholesale markets) and, especially in those states
with retail competition, retail power marketers and customer energy service
firms.41 These entities take on functions historically played by the public utility
but, as a regulatory matter, are often not formally bound to the same set of
service obligations. This includes the duty to serve, which typically remains
with the public utility that directly serves customers, regardless of whether it
operates within a state with no, partial, or complete restructuring.42 On its face,
regulation would appear to limit liability for non-utilities, but non-utility actors
are increasingly able to respond to crises in a nimble manner and may be even

36. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries
Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1324–25 (1998).
37. BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED
RESOURCES, at xi–xiii, xvii (2012).
38. See TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES
281–90 (2010).
39. See William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1614, 1618–19
(2014).
40. See Nicholas Bagley, Medicine as a Public Calling, 114 MICH. L. REV. 57, 60–62 (2015).
41. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2020 tbl.1.3 (2022),
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/pdf/epa.pdf [https://perma.cc/SER9-G8TJ] (reporting that
more than thirty-five percent of electricity supply comes from non-utility generation); Power Marketers
Are Increasing Their Share of U.S. Retail Electricity Sales, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 12, 2018),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=36415 [https://perma.cc/5NNW-8N8Y] (noting
that power marketers supplied twenty-one percent of retail electricity sold in 2016).
42. See Jim Rossi, The Common Law “Duty To Serve” and Protection of Consumers in an Age of
Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1243 (1998) [hereinafter Rossi,
The “Duty To Serve” and Protection of Consumers].
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better positioned than utilities to control the same risks of harm—calling into
question whether this traditional approach continues to make sense.
B.

Constituent Obligations

As described above, the duty to serve is central to historical shifts in the
understanding of utility service, including efforts to extend service to rural and
impoverished communities,43 and is also central to modern debates surrounding
universal service and net neutrality in telecommunications.44 The constituent
obligations of the duty to serve, however, are often left unspecified by both
regulators and courts. With various degrees of comprehension, commentators
have attempted detailed assessments of the regulatory obligations that the duty
to serve entails—and we do not purport to reproduce them here.45 Rather, we
think it is important to make an effort to isolate the nature of the various
obligations a utility’s duty to serve entails, to whom these obligations are owed,
and the remedies that the law provides for violation of these obligations. We
believe that this will allow for a clearer understanding of how the duty to serve
supplements other requirements (such as price regulation, described above) that
attach to public utilities and provide a more complete articulation of when
private remedies are available for violation of the duty to serve.
Echoing Lord Hale, modern accounts of the duty to serve commonly
explain it as a part of the hypothetical bargain associated with the state granting
a private utility a monopoly franchise.46 As one early Illinois Supreme Court
case put it, “[i]t is well settled that parties, who carry on a business which is
public in its nature, or which is impressed with a public interest, must serve all
who apply on equal terms and at reasonable rates.”47 Understood as a distinct
43. HAAR & FESSLER, supra note 21, at 15–19; see also Joseph William Singer, No Right To Exclude:
Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1298 (1996) (“[T]he most plausible
statement of the law is that all businesses open to the public had a duty to serve the public.”).
44. See, e.g., Keeping the Internet Neutral?: Tim Wu and Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 FED. COMMC’NS
L.J. 575, 575–80 (2007); see also Tripp Mickle, Google Should Be Treated as Utility, Ohio Argues in New
Lawsuit, WALL ST. J. (June 8, 2021, 7:04 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/google-should-betreated-as-utility-ohio-argues-in-new-lawsuit-11623172734 [https://perma.cc/4HDQ-DVUE (staffuploaded, dark archive)] (raising the claim that an internet search engine should be regulated as a public
utility under state common law).
45. See Heather Payne, Unservice: Reconceptualizing the Utility Duty To Serve in Light of Climate
Change, 56 U. RICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 5–15) (on file with authors).
46. States typically grant electric utilities a franchise to operate in a given geographic footprint,
subject to price regulation aimed at ensuring that the utility can recover its costs. This grant is not
without condition, and utilities must comply with a number of regulatory requirements, including the
obligations encompassed by the duty to serve. See Jim Rossi, Universal Service in Competitive Retail
Electric Power Markets: Whither the Duty To Serve?, 21 ENERGY L.J. 27, 30 (2000) [hereinafter Rossi,
Universal Service].
47. City of Danville v. Danville Water Co., 53 N.E. 118, 122 (Ill. 1899); see also Messer v. S.
Airways Sales Co., 17 So. 2d 679, 682 (Ala. 1944) (“[T]he law cannot compel any individual to serve

100 N.C. L. REV. 1135 (2022)

2022]

DUTY TO ADAPT

1147

duty owed by a utility to a customer, the duty to serve encompasses several
specific requirements, including obligations “to interconnect and extend service
if requested, to provide continuing reliable service, to provide advanced notice
of service disconnection, and to continue service without full payment.”48 For
example, courts have invoked the duty to serve to require a gas company to
allow a prospective customer to interconnect with its gas lines, despite the
utility’s allegation that it lacked adequate supply to meet its existing customers’
needs.49
The duty to serve has also been commonly interpreted to encompass a
duty to render “adequate” service,50 or to only discriminate in providing terms
of service where it is reasonable to do so. Defining the specific nature of a duty
that hinges on “adequacy,” “reasonableness,” or even a set understanding of
“service” has proved inevitably elusive. Variation may in part be inevitable;
what constitutes adequate service depends on “the type of service rendered and
the needs of the area in which the utility operates.”51 Statutory text across
jurisdictions thus provides a starting place, with standards for adequate service
frequently set via state statute. At a minimum, a utility typically must “provide
safe, continuous, comfortable, and efficient service with facilities that reflect
technological developments in the industry.”52 Such standards were designed
with historic conceptions of reliability in mind, and the duty to serve thus plays
an important role in setting a community’s expectations for energy services.
These set the floor for recovery in negligence, and the duty to serve itself is not
tethered to the traditional regulatory confines of what constitutes reliable
service.
For example, California’s Public Utilities Code (“PUC”) Section 451 lays
the foundation for public utilities’ duty to serve, requiring that “[e]very public
utility shall furnish and maintain such adequate, efficient, just, and reasonable
service, instrumentalities, equipment, and facilities . . . as are necessary to
promote the safety, health, comfort, and convenience of its patrons, employees,
and the public.”53 California utilities’ duty is also informed by their tariffs with
customers: California PUC Rule 14, which regulated utilities typically
incorporate into their tariff filings with state regulators, requires utilities to
another; but it does make it clear that any one who undertakes a public employment is thereby
committed to the performance of that service in the way which the law says that conditions demand
for the protection of the public.”).
48. Rossi, The “Duty To Serve” and Protection of Consumers, supra note 42, at 1243.
49. State ex rel. Wood v. Consumers’ Gas Tr. Co., 61 N.E. 674, 677 (Ind. 1901).
50. Peter W. Hanschen & Gordon P. Erspamer, A Public Utility’s Obligation To Serve: Saber or
Double-Edged Sword?, 17 ELEC. J. 32, 35 (2004).
51. The Duty of a Public Utility, supra note 22, at 313.
52. Id.
53. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 451 (Westlaw through Ch. 12 of 2022 Reg. Sess.).
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“exercise reasonable diligence and care to furnish and deliver a continuous and
sufficient supply of electric energy to the customer.”54 This provision has been
interpreted by the courts to require that utilities take affirmative actions to
avoid unreasonable risks to customers and, where possible, to minimize the
effects of outages.55 Florida’s duty-to-serve statute includes a similar set of
obligations to exercise reasonable care in the provision of service.56
These statutory and contractual obligations are rooted in common law
origins and often encase standards of care. For example, existing statutes or
regulations that provide energy service requirements may set a standard of care
under the theory of liability that every first-year law student knows as
“negligence per se”—meaning a party has breached their duty of care and is thus
negligent solely by violating a statute or regulation.57 Importantly, however, the
establishment of a standard of care for negligence per se does not prevent courts
from also holding a regulated firm to a common law standard of care that
requires even more precautions than the statute or regulation. Similarly, absent
a legislative directive to the contrary, application of the duty to serve is not
limited to contractual terms or to requirements defined by regulation.58 Instead,
regulators and courts alike have long recognized that the duty to serve is also
closely tied to negligence concepts in tort law. For example, the California
Supreme Court has allowed a customer to sue a utility for economic losses it
suffered in the operation of a fish hatchery due to a failure to provide power.59
While the utility is “not an insurer or guarantor of service,” the court reasoned,
it has a “general duty to exercise reasonable care in operating its system to avoid
54. See, e.g., PAC. GAS & ELEC. CO., ELECTRIC RULE NO. 14: SHORTAGE OF SUPPLY AND
INTERRUPTION OF DELIVERY (2003), https://www.pge.com/tariffs/assets/pdf/tariffbook/ELEC_
RULES_14.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SXZ-32LG] (documenting a Pacific Gas & Electric tariff
describing terms of service for end-use customers and their agents).
55. See Langley v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 262 P.2d 846, 852–53 (Cal. 1953) (en banc); Mobil Oil
Corp. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., No. B145834, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 595, at *46–49 (Jan. 21,
2003).
56. FLA. STAT. § 366.03 (Westlaw through Mar. 15, 2022, in effect from the 2022 2d Reg. Sess)
(“Each public utility shall furnish to each person applying therefor reasonably sufficient, adequate, and
efficient service upon terms as required by the commission. . . . All rates and charges made, demanded,
or received by any public utility for any service rendered, or to be rendered by it, and each rule and
regulation of such public utility, shall be fair and reasonable.”). As an example of how this standard is
applied, FPL’s tariff, which has been approved by utility regulators, states that the company “will use
reasonable diligence at all times to provide continuous service” to customers. FLA. POWER & LIGHT
CO., GENERAL RULES & REGULATIONS FOR ELECTRIC SERVICE (2006), https://www.fpl.com/
content/dam/fpl/us/en/rates/pdf/electric-tariff-section6.pdf [https://perma.cc/6T5Y-ECUF (staffuploaded archive)]. It also states that it is not liable for interruptions “from causes beyond its control,”
including “through the ordinary negligence of its employees, servants or agents.” Id.
57. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 14 (AM.
L. INST. 2010).
58. Messer v. S. Airways Sales Co., 17 So. 2d 679, 682 (Ala. 1944).
59. Langley, 262 P.2d at 849.
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unreasonable risk of harm to the persons and property of its customers.”60 Even
where a utility’s unreasonable conduct did not cause an outage, it still might be
liable for injuries from outages where the cause “could have been prevented by
foresight and sufficient expenditure” and where it should have been “taking
steps to ensure performance and to prevent an event from occurring.”61
Recognizing a private claim based on the duty to serve affords victims a
distinct remedy for harm that is suffered due to a utility’s misconduct or failure
to act, while also holding the industry accountable to a flexible, evolving
standard of care.62
At the same time, the duty to serve also inherently resists precision.
Articulating the exact nature of its obligations ex ante is difficult.63 Cases
invoking the duty to serve will often involve a utility itself asking for a regulator
or court to allow it to cover the costs of providing service to customers in
accordance with then-existing legal requirements. But the duty to serve’s
specific common law obligations are not always spelled out in advance: only
once a plaintiff sues the utility to recover for the utility’s past misconduct will
they even come up. In this sense, much like other tort standards of care, the
precise expectations of the standard of care required by the duty to serve are
only spelled out by courts ex post.
Indeed, the very idea of what constitutes “adequate service” from an
energy utility is not fixed and evolves as new technologies become available or
as customer uses of energy change. For example, adequate service today in areas
where customers charge electrical vehicles and have rooftop solar may differ
from the understanding of adequate service fifty years ago. Likewise, the
understanding of adequate service in some areas of the country, such as Denver,
may evolve too, as extreme heat events make air conditioning necessary to
maintain health during summer months.64 A negligence standard seems
60. Id.
61. Mobil Oil Corp. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., No. B145834, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 595, at
*30–31 (Jan. 21, 2003) (emphasis omitted).
62. Importantly, however, in instances where liability was found, plaintiffs have typically
demonstrated actual knowledge of the specific risks and harms that would be incurred from service
outage—typical of the kind of foreseeability courts would require to meet the breach element of
negligence. See Comment, Liability of Public Utility for Temporary Interruption of Service: National Food
Stores, Inc. v. Union Electric Co., 494 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973), 1974 WASH. U. L.Q. 344,
350 [hereinafter National Food Stores Comment].
63. “Cases dealing with liability for failure or breach of duty to supply electric current of sufficient
power and continuity for a specified purpose do not satisfactorily define the character and extent of the
duty.” C.L. Feinstock, Annotation, Liability of Electric Power or Light Company to Patron for Interruption,
Failure, or Inadequacy of Power, 4 A.L.R.3d 594 § 2[b] (1965).
64. In response to an expected shift toward hotter summers, as was experienced during 2021,
Denver’s Office of Climate Action, Sustainability and Resilience has proposed installing heat pumps
(reversible air conditioning units) powered by renewable energy, targeting the most vulnerable
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especially well suited to adapt the utility standard of care to changing societal
expectations, especially where regulation itself is not consistently updated to
reflect a community’s evolving understanding of adequate energy service.
Precedent may well counsel against imbuing the duty to serve with too
granular of precision; however, some analytical precision is important to
identify the general obligations that it entails. In terms of the duty to serve’s
adequate service requirements, case law emphasizes obligations to (1) provide
reasonable notice of interruption, (2) take reasonable measures to minimize
outages, and (3) meet industry-wide technical standards.
First, the duty to serve requires utilities to provide sufficient notice of
impending interruption to their customers. For example, in National Food Stores,
Inc. v. Union Electric Co.,65 record heat waves in the summer of 1966 strained
the defendant utility’s ability to meet soaring electric demand.66 In the face of
impending system failure, the defendant instituted “load reduction”—that is, it
disconnected service to certain customers to preserve overall system integrity.67
The plaintiff food store was one such customer and suffered spoilage of
perishable food as a result.68 It sued not on the basis of interrupted service, but
on the defendant’s failure to provide notice of that impending interruption.69
While the defendant claimed it owed no such duty, the court held that “an
electric power company which undertakes to supply current, although not an
insurer of service, has an obligation to provide a patron with adequate and
continuous service.”70 This obligation encompasses a duty to “give a reasonable
notice to its consumers of its intentions to interrupt services when the utility
knows or could reasonably anticipate a situation that would make it necessary
to interrupt service” and “knows or should know that by so failing to give notice
the interruptions might result in loss or harm to its consumers.”71
Second, the duty to serve requires utilities to proactively manage
equipment and operations to minimize outages. Here, the duty to serve requires
that a utility not arbitrarily cut off service. Tort liability for interruptions in
power and/or failure of service is typically available to customers who suffer
communities without air conditioning (which thirty percent of Denver homes lack). See Sam Brasch &
Rebecca Spiess, Denver Has a New Plan To Keep Residents Cool—Without Wrecking the Climate,
DENVERITE (June 14, 2021, 10:57 PM), https://denverite.com/2021/06/14/stay-cool-without-wrecking
-the-climate/ [https://perma.cc/H5C7-6QHV].
65. 494 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
66. Id. at 381. Notice was also central to the court’s inquiry in the above-mentioned case, Langley
v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 262 P.2d 846, 847 (Cal. 1953) (en banc).
67. Nat’l Food Stores, 494 S.W.2d at 381.
68. Id. at 380.
69. Id. at 381.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 384.
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harm as well.72 Most states limit liability for service interruption to conduct that
is, at the very minimum, negligent, though many states’ regulations or approved
tariffs provide some defense to customer recovery unless the utility was
willfully or grossly negligent.73 Most courts have upheld these provisions,74
though some have suggested that they should be void for public policy purposes
similar to liability waivers in tort.75
Provisions of continuous service are additionally relevant. The court in
Curry v. Norwood Electric Light & Power Co.,76 for instance, was asked whether
the defendant public utility was obligated to furnish continuous electric service
to the plaintiff.77 The court held in the affirmative, referencing the standard
foreseeability principle of whether the defendant should have “anticipated or
expected such a situation to arise.”78 Likewise, in Pager v. Metropolitan Edison,79
defendant Metropolitan Edison cut off service to a customer who sold a home
in foreclosure, leading to pipes freezing and damage to the property.80 The case
for private recovery was allowed to go forward on a negligence theory based on
the utility’s obligation to provide service that is “reasonably continuous and
without unreasonable interruptions of delay.”81 These private suits can be
understood as negligence claims to the extent that a utility “which holds itself
out to serve the public” must “exercise reasonable diligence and care towards its
customers.”82 While in most cases temporary interruptions of service do not
72. See, e.g., Rossin v. S. Union Gas Co., 472 F.2d 707, 709–10 (10th Cir. 1973) (noting that a
negligence standard applies to storm-related service cutoff that caused harm to plaintiff’s property, but
rejecting a claim for recovery based on the trial court’s finding that the storm from January 2–8, 1971,
was “unequaled in New Mexico climatological history in both intensity and duration” and that the
“storm was not forecast with a degree of accuracy necessary to give warning of its severity”).
73. E.g., Singer Co. v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 558 A.2d 419, 428 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989)
(finding no liability for an interruption where the tariff says the utility is only liable for willful default,
meaning “an intentional omission or failure to perform,” or willful neglect, meaning “intentional,
conscious, or known negligence”); Perez v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 452 N.Y.S.2d 510, 515–16 (Civ. Ct.
1982) (finding Consolidated Edison’s tariff provided a limited exemption from liability for ordinary
negligence). Contra Sw. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Artesia Alfalfa Growers’ Ass’n, 353 P.2d 62, 69 (N.M. 1960)
(finding that an existing tariff was not sufficient for the utility to avoid negligence liability).
74. See, e.g., Lee v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 413 N.Y.S.2d 826, 828 (App. Term 1978) (per
curiam) (finding that an exculpatory clause for negligence, but not gross negligence, did not violate
public policy).
75. See Artesia Alfalfa Growers’ Ass’n, 353 P.2d at 69 (finding a contract that relieved an electric
company of all liability for temporary interruptions violated public policy on the ground that a duty to
furnish adequate, efficient, and reasonable service was owed and so negligently caused harm was not
excused).
76. 211 N.Y.S. 441 (Cnty. Ct. 1925).
77. Id. at 443.
78. Id. at 443–44.
79. No. 17-CV-00934, 2019 WL 4736227 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2019).
80. Id. at *2.
81. Id. at *10.
82. National Food Stores Comment, supra note 62, at 346 n.12.
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produce liability, “negligent acts or omissions which cause foreseeable harm”
may.83
Third, suits allowing for private recovery against utilities frequently hinge
on whether utility operators have met the industry-wide technical standards or
expectations for the provision of service on the electric grid. For example, suits
for recovery may turn on whether the level of power (voltage) provided is
sufficient or on whether utilities have handled power transmission or
distribution equipment in a reasonable manner. Providing insufficient current
to properly light a 100-watt lamp,84 failing to provide electrical current of a
sufficient voltage to power a cold storage plant,85 and switching transformer
systems causing a loss of power significantly reducing heat to a hatchery are all
examples.86 Where a customer suffers harm in such cases, a negligence claim
may be brought for failing to use reasonable care to provide adequate power or
for breach of contract, implied or express, to provide adequate power or a stated
level of power.87 With respect to these cases, the duty to serve plays an
additional function: it helps to ensure that utilities are held to a standard of care
that reflects technical feasibility and custom in the industry.
C.

A Typology of the Duty To Serve’s Constituent Obligations

Building on this initial identification of the constituent obligations
associated with the public utility duty to provide adequate service, this section
presents a typology (Figure 1) that separates the various duties and obligations
that are commonly associated with the duty to serve. In so doing, we hope to
more clearly identify those obligations that are relevant to private tort suits
responding to climate change—underscoring in particular the private
enforcement dimension of the duty to serve.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 348 n.17.
Ky. Power Co. v. Kilbourn, 307 S.W.2d 9, 13 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957).
Bromer v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 45 So. 2d 658, 659 (Fla. 1950) (en banc).
Lund v. Village of Princeton, 85 N.W.2d 197, 200–01 (Minn. 1957).
Feinstock, supra note 63, § 2[b].
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Figure 1. Duty To Serve—Typology
Scope of the Duty
To Serve

Duty To Provide
Adequate Service

Duty To Extend
Service
Duty To
Interconnect with
Suppliers and
Open-Access
Obligations

Duty-ToServe
Obligations

To Whom
Owed

Primary Remedies88

Adequate
notice

Current
customers

Minimize
outages

Current
customers

Meet technical
standards

Limited and
identifiable
class of
foreseeable
victims

1. Regulatory enforcement
(through applicable standards
and enforcement)
2. Private enforcement (through
contract and tort claims)
1. Regulatory proceedings,
through utility service standards
(and accompanying penalties for
violation)
2. Private enforcement (through
contract and tort claims)
1. Regulatory enforcement
(through applicable standards
and enforcement)
2. Private enforcement (through
contract and tort claims)

X

X

X

X

X

X

The first column of Figure 1 organizes the scope of the duty to serve,
which historically includes constituent duties around extension of service,
interconnection with suppliers, and open-access obligations. As noted above,
the core duty-to-serve obligations surrounding the duty of adequate service
include constituent obligations to: (1) provide reasonable notification of
impending interruption, (2) take reasonable measures to minimize outages, and
(3) meet technical standards in the operation of the energy grid. This specific
core duty and set of constituent obligations form the foundation of the duty to
adapt.
Importantly, these three obligations implicate both public remedies
(regulatory enforcement by agencies) and private remedies (legal claims
available to individuals), as reflected in the last column of the typology. In
instances where tariffs outline the terms of service and a remedy for harm, a

88. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list of remedies but instead to describe the primary
remedies associated with each dimension of the duty to serve.
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tariff may specify the consequence of service interruption, or in some instances
regulators may be subject to regulatory penalties for failure to comply with a
regulatory duty to serve. But these tariff and regulatory obligations serve as a
floor and are supplemented by tort obligations. Unlike any previous discussion
of the duty to serve, this Article places its focus on private remedies for the
conditions within the control of a utility that cause harm to foreseeable victims.
As is the case with any negligence standard of conduct, once a foreseeable zone
of risk of harm is identified, an energy utility has an obligation to exercise
reasonable care to mitigate that risk. Private enforcement through tort claims is
an important vehicle for making sure that the utility makes reasonable decisions
in the operation of its infrastructure. As is reflected in the third column of
Figure 1, how the duty to serve obligates utilities can depend on one’s status as
a current customer or a foreseeable member of the public who could be harmed
by a utility’s operations. As is discussed below, the scope of the duty to serve is
not limitless, or, in other words, it is not a duty to the world at large.
We also think it important to distinguish the core obligations related to
the provision of adequate and reliable utility service from other adjacent
regulatory requirements, some of which are imposed on regulated utilities under
the duty-to-serve rubric. Two of those are relevant here, namely,
interconnection (or service-extension) requirements and open-access
requirements.
The duty to serve often refers to a utility’s obligation to provide service to
a customer within the utility’s franchise area. Utility franchise regulation often
gives utilities a service monopoly, and price regulation allows a utility to recover
a fair rate of return for the costs it incurs to provide customers service in this
franchise area.89 A duty to serve can require a utility to provide and continue
service to customers even when it would not ordinarily be considered profitable
to do so.90 In rate regulation, utilities are commonly subject to an obligation to
charge just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rates. Questions of prudency,
and whether the utility’s costs were so incurred, dominate.91 This rateregulation requirement is closely connected to and complementary with the
duty to serve, but at its core it is a different type of obligation, focused on the
utility’s right to recover costs and on how customers are treated vis-à-vis other
customers.92 The duty to serve differs from broad regulatory obligations related
89. Rossi, Universal Service, supra note 46, at 29.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Payne, supra note 45 (manuscript at 15–22) (exploring the ways in which statutorily
crafted duty-to-serve obligations interact with prudent investment considerations in the context of
climate change).
92. Prudency may serve as an additional basis to compel proactive action by utilities to prepare
for climate change impacts. See WEBB ET AL., supra note 10, at 18–20.
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to the utility’s cost of capital, or the obligation that the utility owes its investors.
The duty to serve—understood as an obligation that a utility owes to its
customers or other private individuals—is also distinct from the policy
questions of what different customer segments may owe (commonly known as
“rate allocation”). Issues related to the setting of rates and rate allocation are
deeply immersed in policy trade-offs, best assessed by expert regulators to the
extent that their resolution is highly contingent on specific facts regarding a
utility’s financial operations. The duty to serve has been employed all too often
in this context as utility providers’ justification for added expense, despite
measures relating only tangentially to reliability.93 But as an obligation between
the utility and private parties, the duty to serve has a structure and scope
distinct from price regulation. It applies even where a regulator has not deemed
an investment to be prudent, and, in addition to affording regulatory remedies
(which often overlap with price regulation), the duty to serve can create distinct
and independent private (common law) obligations and remedies for harm.94
The duty to serve is also a distinct obligation from other regulatory
requirements that apply to grid operators related to the protection of
competition or markets. In terms of economic regulation, some industries are
considered common carriers (most notably railroads), while others (such as
natural gas and electric power) are routinely subjected to specific open-access
requirements.95 Such regulatory requirements differ from the duty to serve, to
the extent that they primarily draw on economic and antitrust principles to
create obligations toward competitors or other firms serving the same market.
They are typically not geared toward customers or others who are harmed by a
utility’s operations, apart from ensuring that the service offered to a customer
is the byproduct of a fair market transaction. Antitrust law reinforces some of
the same goals as economic regulation, to the extent that it protects against
monopolistic conduct and protects competition between firms. But again, these
obligations are owed to competing business and are distinct from the duty to
serve customers or members of the public.
For purposes of analysis, the typology presented in Figure 1 identifies the
constituent duty to provide adequate service, but the various obligations of the
duty to serve can overlap. The remainder of this Article focuses on the duty to
serve’s private obligation to provide adequate service. This is not intended to
diminish the significance of other duties, such as the duty to extend service or
the duty to provide competitors open access to the grid.96 Our typology instead
93. See Hanschen & Erspamer, supra note 50, at 32–34.
94. The Duty of a Public Utility, supra note 22, at 312–13.
95. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 36, at 1327.
96. For example, service-extension requirements can be important to customers who generate
their own power via rooftop solar and may need to rely on the grid for backup power. And open-access
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aims to emphasize that these duties differ in type from the duty to provide
adequate service, in terms of the nature of the remedies they typically afford
and the manner in which their expectations are usually spelled out.97 Our
typology’s identification of constituent obligations of a utility’s duty to provide
adequate service supports courts looking to the duty to serve as a basis for
adjudicating tort claims based on the adaptation harms associated with climate
change—a task we turn to in the next part of this Article.
II. CLIMATE CHANGE AND PRIVATE LAW’S DUTY TO ADAPT
As a regulatory matter, since the duty to serve customers requires a utility
to meet service expectations, its core obligations have been incorporated into
most past utility planning and investment decisions in the form of reliability
requirements.98 In this sense the duty to serve sets a physical baseline for any
utility’s infrastructure capacity. But the obligations of the duty to serve are not
limited to determining the reasonableness of a utility’s past investment
decisions, as reflected in just and reasonable rates; they also serve as an ongoing
obligation for the utility to take precautions to guard against foreseeable
interruption of service and provide continued access to electrical supply in its
operation and planning. This obligation is often expressed in the language of
reliability but also encompasses girding against foreseeable reliability threats,
including not only commonplace electric interruptions—but also, increasingly,
concerns expressed in terms of energy resilience, or “the ability to withstand,
adapt and recover from disasters.”99
Climate change can pose new challenges to energy reliability and
resilience, which in turn can produce new vulnerabilities related to the
operation of infrastructure.100 To the extent that utility operations produce
reasonably foreseeable harms, and actions to protect against those harms are
known within the industry, there is sufficient evidence to support judicial
requirements for transmission utilities are important to renewable energy resources that need
competitive access to transmission. While these obligations can be described in terms of the duty to
serve, their discussion is beyond the scope of this Article.
97. For both utility service and open-access requests, the harms suffered by victims are typically
forward-looking and the regulatory process typically provides both a fairly complete service obligation
and a remedy for noncompliance. By contrast, harms related to the duty to provide adequate service
are primarily backward looking (much like other tort claims) and are more likely to be based on an
incompletely defined regulatory obligation and a lack of a complete regulatory remedy for the injury.
98. See Hanschen & Erspamer, supra note 50, at 35.
99. See Habibollah Raoufi, Vahid Vahidinasab & Kamyar Mehran, Power Systems Resilience
Metrics: A Comprehensive Review of Challenges and Outlook, SUSTAINABILITY, Nov. 20, 2020, at 1, 1,
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/12/22/9698/htm [https://perma.cc/6NWE-UPZW (staff-uploaded
archive)].
100. See, e.g., Alexandra Klass, Joshua Macey, Shelley Welton & Hannah Wiseman, Grid Reliability
Through Clean Energy, 74 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 3–5) (on file with authors).
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recognition of an ongoing tort duty. In other words, the traditional duty to serve
extends to obligate public utilities to make operational and planning decisions
in a manner that accounts for changing conditions in light of climate change.
We term this novel legal obligation the “duty to adapt.” At the most
abstract level, the duty to adapt almost reads like mathematical proof: (1) the
duty to serve obligates utilities to protect against foreseeable service
interruption; (2) climate change and the accompanying variance in extreme
weather events create new and often foreseeable adaptation risks for energy grid
operations, such as a heightened risk of service interruption; and so (3) utilities
must take ongoing actions to guard against climate adaptation risks for energy
infrastructure within their control.
But what does a duty to adapt require in application, to whom does it
extend, and how can a utility effectively discharge a duty to adapt or meet its
standard of reasonable care? These are difficult questions to answer in the
abstract. To give them some grounding, we look to recent examples of climaterelated events that have impacted energy service delivery: power outages
related to the 2021 winter storm in Texas; damage caused by Hurricane Sandy
in New York in 2012; and wildfires in California in 2007, 2017, and 2018. These
examples show how energy grid operators are increasingly being confronted
with foreseeable risks of harm associated with their operations and have ways
to respond to mitigate these risks. Industry practices and customs are evolving
in rapid new ways, and the duty to adapt has an important role to play in
ensuring that energy grid operators are held to account on an ongoing basis as
new risks materialize and new technological approaches to mitigate risks
become feasible.
This part first briefly describes the state of climate science and the
recognized impacts of extreme weather for the power sector. We believe this
evidence is compelling enough that courts should take general judicial notice of
a general tort duty to adapt for energy utilities. Our analysis focuses on the
negligence element of duty and does not purport to answer specific factual
questions related to breach, which will ultimately be questions for a jury to
decide on a case-by-case basis.101 Still, these examples show that there are
feasible practices in the industry that can reduce many of the risks the energy
grid faces on an ongoing basis. The constituent obligations of the duty to
adapt—namely, interruption notice, outage minimization, and modifying
technical standards—are considered, and then the part turns to the question of
to whom the duty to adapt is owed. This is not a duty to the world at large, but
101. For an excellent survey of the issues related to the determination of whether a duty has been
breached in climate change cases, see Hunter & Salzman, Negligence in the Air, supra note 3, at 1756–
84.
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we argue that courts should apply basic negligence law principles that define
the scope of a duty to customers or, where the risks of harm are foreseeable, to
a limited set of noncustomers.
A.

Climate Change’s Impact on the Energy Grid

Scientific consensus of anthropogenic climate change is well established.102
Its consequences are immense and will only grow in magnitude, imparting farreaching risks to virtually all aspects of society. As a sector largely defined by
its capital-intensive, immense, and place-based nature, electric power is
especially vulnerable to consequences of climate change.103 As much as twentyseven percent of all power production in the United States could be severely
impacted by the 2030s104—raising a significant possibility that many energy grid
activities will present new forms of climate adaptation risks that cause harms to
customers and others.
These harms should be highly relevant to an industry that is intensely risk
adverse in other areas. Because energy grid outages are expensive, healthharming events,105 the sector has been built, in certain aspects, to meet reliability
expectations that guard against the risk of large-scale system outage. Significant
effort goes into preventative measures and contingency planning to prevent
blackouts, including designing and operating the power system “in a manner
102. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014
SYNTHESIS REPORT: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 2 (2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/
uploads/2018/02/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9XF-3PCE]; John Cook, Naomi
Oreskes, Peter T. Doran, William R.L. Anderegg, Bart Verheggen, Ed W. Maibach, J. Stuart Carlton,
Stephan Lewandowsky, Andrew G. Skuce, Sarah A. Green, Dana Nuccitelli, Peter Jacobs, Mark
Richardson, Bärbel Winkler, Rob Painting & Ken Rice, Consensus on Consensus: A Synthesis of Consensus
Estimates on Human-Caused Global Warming, 11 ENV’T RSCH. LETTERS, April 13, 2016, at 1, 1,
https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/11/4/048002 [https://perma.cc/C3RC-GS7Z].
103. See, e.g., Lisa Wood, Ross Hemphill, John Howat, Ralph Cavanagh & Severin Borenstein,
Rethinking Rate Design: Berkeley Lab’s Discussion with Five Experts, PUB. UTILS. FORT., Nov. 2016, at 20,
21–25 (discussing the need for rate changes in response to the changing consumer energy demand);
JOHN J. MACWILLIAMS, SARAH LA MONACA & JAMES KOBUS, COLUMBIA SIPA CTR. ON GLOB.
ENERGY POL’Y, PG&E: MARKET AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON THE FIRST CLIMATE CHANGE
BANKRUPTCY 6–7 (2019), https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/file-uploads/PG
&E-CGEP_Report_081519-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZDS-RJWS].
104. Poulomi Ganguli, Devashish Kumar & Auroop R. Ganguly, US Power Production at Risk from
Water Stress in a Changing Climate, 7 SCI. REPS., Sept. 20, 2017, at 1, 1, Error! Hyperlink reference not
valid.https://www.nature.com/articles/
s41598-017-12133-9#ref-CR16
[https://perma.cc/2LGBEPRY] (noting that U.S. power production is particularly vulnerable to water scarcity and estimating
water stress for power production with about twenty-seven percent of the production severely impacted
by the 2030s).
105. KRISTINA HAMACHI LACOMMARE & JOSEPH H. ETO, ERNEST ORLANDO LAWRENCE
BERKELEY NAT’L LAB’Y, UNDERSTANDING THE COST OF POWER INTERRUPTIONS TO U.S.
ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS, at i (2004), https://eta-publications.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/lbnl55718.pdf [https://perma.cc/49XS-6XAY] (estimating the annual cost to consumers of power
interruptions at $80 billion).
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that the likelihood of having to disconnect customers occurs no more than one
day in ten years, on average.”106
Increasingly too, utilities have placed an emphasis on energy resilience.107
In contrast to electric reliability, where overlapping standards and practices
function to minimize commonplace service disruptions, energy resilience is
concerned with a system’s “ability to withstand, adapt and recover from
disasters.”108 Improving energy resilience may require practices and activities
different from those associated with ensuring electric reliability. For example,
energy resilience requires grid planners and operators to learn lessons from
prior disruptions and to plan how to better handle the next crisis facing the
grid.109 Additionally, actions associated with improved energy resilience may
include recognition that the system needs to be designed to anticipate some
operational planning and to respond quickly to crises by providing customer
services such as backup power or energy storage.110
Climate change is relevant to both energy reliability and resilience. As to
the former, climate change will shift the historical weather baselines used in
planning, from temperature to sea-level rise.111 These shifts in baseline
conditions affect public utility assets and operations in foreseeable, addressable
ways. For example, testimony in a 2013 Consolidated Edison rate case revealed
that utility equipment had been designed with precise temperature parameters
in mind that did not account for temperature increases expected as a result of
climate change.112 Doing so left the equipment impaired and unlikely to
function across the course of its planned useful life.113 As to the latter, climate
106. What is Reliability?, ISO NEW ENG., https://www.iso-ne.com/about/what-we-do/indepth/what-is-reliability [https://perma.cc/RE6U-UKQ8]. We take no position here on whether this
standard is the best one to minimize harms. For discussion of how a reliable electric power grid differs
from a resilient grid, see Sue Tierney, Opinion, About That National Conversation on Resilience of the
Electric Grid: The Urgent Need for Guidance and Action, UTIL. DIVE (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.
utilitydive.com/news/about-that-national-conversation-on-resilience-of-the-electric-grid-the-ur/5125
45/ [https://perma.cc/KW3T-K4HF].
107. See Klass et al., supra note 100 (manuscript at 11–12).
108. Raoufi et al., supra note 99, at 1.
109. News Release, Nat’l Acads. Scis., Eng’g, & Med., Enhancing the Resilience of the Nation’s
Electricity System (July 20, 2017), https://www.nationalacademies.org/news/2017/07/enhancing-theresilience-of-the-nations-electricity-system [https://perma.cc/X2RP-ANNT].
110. See Tierney, supra note 106.
111. P.C.D. Milly, Julio Betancourt, Malin Falkenmark, Robert M. Hirsch, Zbigniew W.
Kundzewicz, Dennis P. Lettenmaier & Ronald J. Stouffer, Stationarity Is Dead: Whither Water
Management, 319 SCIENCE 573, 573–74 (2008).
112. Env’t Def. Fund & Colum. L. Sch. Sabin Ctr. for Climate Change L., Comment Letter on
FERC’s Request for Comments Related to the Technical Conference on Climate Change, Extreme
Weather, and Electric System Reliability (Docket No. AD21-13-000), at 10 (Apr. 15, 2021) [hereinafter
EDF & Sabin Comments], https://www.icrrl.org/files/2021/06/EDF-Sabin-Center-Comments.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PME9-2BET].
113. Id.
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change effects on energy resilience are often expressed in the form of extreme
weather impacts on the electric grid and upstream energy suppliers. Aspects of
extreme weather events are likewise increasingly foreseeable and addressable.
The frequency and intensity of such events are shifting in understandable ways,
and accounting for such shifts can improve core utility planning assumptions.114
Revealing how climate change affects extreme weather is critical, as such
events are perhaps the most significant event-rated risk that utilities today need
to consider in their operations and planning. Extreme weather is already the
leading cause of electric outages in the United States, and weather-related
outages are expected to increase in coming years.115 The North American
Electric Reliability Corporation (“NERC”), the federally designated electricreliability organization that provides reliability standards for the electric power
transmission grid (including standards that are used by regulators),116 has
analyzed data to evaluate risk profiles for various foreseeable events affecting
the operation of the bulk electric transmission system, focusing on the
likelihood of an event occurring and the adverse impacts associated with it.117
With respect to extreme weather events, one of the most significant risk profiles
identified, NERC has explained, “[I]t is important for operations and planning
personnel to remain vigilant and prepare for high-risk seasons by learning from
prior events, practicing recovery efforts, and anticipating impacts of an event
to critical infrastructure . . . .”118
Despite the premium placed upon grid reliability, the electricity sector has
been slow to proactively consider climate-related risks in its planning,
investment, and operational decisions.119 This failure is not due to an inability
to foresee the consequences of changed climate conditions. Instead, it is often
due to embedded planning assumptions about weather patterns, such as
stationarity (or the notion that variance is constant over fixed time periods).120
With climate change, we are facing new variations in the extremes, frequency,
and distribution of environmental attributes, such as temperature, precipitation,
114. Id. at 11–12.
115. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, QUADRENNIAL ENERGY REVIEW: TRANSFORMING THE
NATION’S ELECTRICITY SYSTEM: THE SECOND INSTALLMENT OF THE QER, at S-12 (2017),
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/02/f34/Quadrennial%20Energy%20Review--Second%
20Installment%20%28Full%20Report%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZJ5-7PHC].
116. North American Electric Reliability Corp., 116 FERC ¶ 61,062 paras. 3–4 (2006) (ERO
Certification Order).
117. See NERC RELIABILITY ISSUES STEERING COMM., 2019 ERO RELIABILITY RISK
PRIORITIES REPORT 5–6 (2019), https://www.nerc.com/comm/RISC/Documents/RISC%20ERO%
20Priorities%20Report_Third_Draft_September_2019_CLEAN.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3GS-CJRD]
(evaluating risks to the electric transmission system).
118. Id. at 18–19.
119. See WEBB ET AL., supra note 10, at 10.
120. Milly et al., supra note 111, at 573.
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and wildfire; as has been stated in the context of water planning, “stationarity
is dead.”121 Scientific models are increasingly attentive to nonlinear variance and
big picture risks associated with grid service during extreme weather conditions
in particular areas of the country.122 And climate science has evolved to provide
granular enough information that corporate actors can make company-level, and
even asset-level, decisions that consider climate change effects on a probabilistic
basis.123 The degree of specificity should not be overstated; for example, we are
aware of no climate model that can predict with precision that a specific event
will occur at a specific time. However, available models do exist that provide
downscaled climate projections that convey event probabilities with a degree of
accuracy that improves corporate decision-making, including probabilistic
forecasting of system load for utilities.124 This information, in turn, can be used
to inform operational practices and investment standards. These learnings are
highly relevant and implementable, and might result in any number of changes,
from updates to storm de-energization protocols to changes in equipment siting
based on updated floodplain mapping.125
Importantly, the process by which a public utility can obtain this
information is increasingly known throughout the energy industry. The process,
most often referred to as “climate resilience planning,” generally requires that
utilities first develop a climate vulnerability assessment, which identifies where
assets may be at risk from climate impacts, and second enact a climate resilience
plan, which leverages that learning to update equipment, planning, and
operations.126 Yet many utilities still plan for infrastructure based on “similar
day” forecasts predicated on linear data assumptions and have not engaged in
planning that proactively addresses probabilistic risks.127 Often, where
121. See id.
122. See, e.g., Sean W.D. Turner, Kristian Nelson, Nathalie Voisin, Vincent Tidwell, Ariel Miara,
Ana Dyreson, Stuart Cohen, Dan Mantena, Julie Jin, Pete Warnken & Shih-Chieh Kao, A MultiReservoir Model for Projecting Drought Impacts on Thermoelectric Disruption Risk Across the Texas Power
Grid, 231 ENERGY, 2021, at 1, 1 (examining the effects of drought on water storage at thirty major
reservoirs in Texas).
123. STEPHANIE H. JONES, GABRIEL MALEK, MICHAEL PANFIL & DAVID G. VICTOR, ENV’T
DEF. FUND & BROOKINGS, WHAT INVESTORS AND THE SEC CAN LEARN FROM THE TEXAS
POWER CRISIS 9 (2021), https://www.ourenergypolicy.org/resources/what-investors-and-the-sec-canlearn-from-the-texas-power-crises/ [https://perma.cc/6M5P-98DZ].
124. See, e.g., Tao Hong & Shu Fan, Probabilistic Electric Load Forecasting: A Tutorial Review, 32
INT’L J. FORECASTING 914, 914–36 (2016) (explaining probabilistic electric load forecasting).
125. See generally WEBB ET AL., supra note 10, at 4.
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., TAO HONG & MOHAMMAD SHAHIDEHPOUR, E. INTERCONNECTION STATES’
PLAN. COUNCIL, LOAD FORECASTING CASE STUDY 1–3 (2015), https://pubs.naruc.org/pub.cfm?id
=536E10A7-2354-D714-5191-A8AAFE45D626 [https://perma.cc/KT72-8KPK] (“The similar day
method, which derives a future load profile using the historical days with similar temperature profiles
and day type (e.g., day of the week and holiday), is still used by many utilities.”).
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comprehensive risk planning has occurred, it is only following some form of
tragic extreme weather event, leading to a narrow focus on averting a single
type of crisis rather than a broader probabilistic assessment of risks.128 And too
often risk assessment is based on out-of-date historical data and is not regularly
updated based on new data reflecting the variances in weather associated with
climate change or state-of-the-art modeling.129
Part of the challenge today for energy grid operators is the issue of latent
risks associated with legacy investments.130 Historically, most energy planning
focused on planning infrastructure to meet peak customer usage, relying
primarily on past usage data on customer peaks, along with assumptions about
future customer use. Utilities planning for peaks in high usage times typically
rely on past weather records and crude forecasts to predict future weather
problems—and the existing energy transmission grid and most of the power
supply has been built with these assumptions in mind.131 However, today, stateof-the-art data and predictive modeling for energy grid forecasting, planning,
and operations is far more sophisticated.132 As new energy infrastructure is
planned, comprehensive assessment of climate risks (including, in some
instances, adaptation risks) is increasingly common. But this does not address
that the legacy investments that have been made over the past fifty years were
not planned or built with these risks in mind.133 A duty to adapt not only focuses
on the current planning obligations a utility may have when it makes new
investments today but also includes how a utility should plan for and think
about the risks associated with its legacy grid assets.
Historically, utility planning focused on a narrow definition of risks,
fixating on reliability rather than ideas of resilience and risks of other harms,
such as those associated with climate change.134 But the duty to serve is not
128. WEBB ET AL., supra note 10, at 4.
129. Id. at 9–10 (noting, for example, that Entergy only instituted a climate risk and resilience
study following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and Consolidated Edison only did so after Superstorm
Sandy).
130. For a discussion of the challenges presented by legacy risks, see generally Emily Hammond
& Jim Rossi, Stranded Costs and Grid Decarbonization, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 645, 650–63 (2017).
131. See JUAN PABLO CARVALLO, PETER H. LARSEN, ALAN H. SANSTAD & CHARLES A.
GOLDMAN, ERNEST ORLANDO LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB’Y, LOAD FORECASTING IN
ELECTRIC UTILITY INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANNING, at viii–x (2016), https://www.osti.gov/serv
lets/purl/1371722 [https://perma.cc/A9PA-5MCS (staff-uploaded archive)] (comparing usage planning
from twelve U.S. utilities).
132. See WEBB ET AL., supra note 10, at 5 (explaining that the availability of data has increased
significantly in recent years).
133. See Hammond & Rossi, supra note 130, at 650–59 (describing stranded costs in energy
infrastructure).
134. See BENJAMIN L. PRESTON, SCOTT N. BACKHAUS, MARY EWERS, JULIA A. PHILLIPS,
CESAR A. SILVA-MONROY, JEFFREY E. DAGLE, ALFONSO G. TARDITI, JOHN (PAT) LOONEY &
THOMAS J. KING, JR., RESILIENCE OF THE U.S. ELECTRICITY SYSTEM: A MULTI-HAZARD
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confined by such a narrow definition and is flexible enough to apply to
burgeoning challenges to adequate service. Utilities not only need to plan in
order to keep customers’ lights on, they also need to take a big picture approach
to the risks of operating the power grid as a system. Extreme weather events
highlight the interdependence of the energy grid with other environmental
resources, such as the water that is used to cool at least seventy percent of
existing power plant capacity.135 When customer demand for energy is highest
because of extreme weather, water and other inputs to the energy production
process are also likely to be experiencing shortage conditions too.136 And an
unduly narrow approach to promoting reliability can have unintended
consequences that ultimately impair the very service such protocols are
designed to uphold. Failure to affirmatively de-energize power lines in advance
of wildfire conditions might in the short term, for example, provide for
uninterrupted service. Yet system-wide electric service may be interrupted far
longer for a larger number of customers if those same lines directly cause a
wildfire.
A singular fixation on maintaining customer service reliability without
context is ill-advised for a variety of other reasons, including that doing so puts
the long-term maintenance of the grid at risk. Guaranteeing reliability in light
of new forms of climate risk is also likely to be expensive, and the benefits and
costs of service reliability need to be weighed with the customer in mind.137 Ageold concerns embedded in monopolistic industries, particularly surrounding the
lack of competition and utilities’ impulse to overspend, apply here.138 Relatively
low-cost precautions, such as more proactive notice of service interruption and
improved utility planning for emergencies, are among the most effective

PERSPECTIVE 41–42 (2016), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/01/f34/Resilience%20of
%20the%20U.S.%20Electricity%20System%20A%20Multi-Hazard%20Perspective.pdf [https://perma.
cc/8FZ4-B3TF].
135. See Hannah Northey & Peter Behr, Severe Heat, Drought Pack Dual Threat to Power Plants,
ENERGYWIRE (June 28, 2021, 7:08 AM), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2021/06/28/stories/10
63735943?utm_campaign=edition&utm_medium=email&utm_source=eenews%3Aenergywire [http://
perma.cc/7AC7-QR9E (staff-uploaded archive)] (observing that more than seventy percent of the U.S.
power plant capacity requires water for cooling and that severe drought presents an especially
precarious situation for thermoelectric plants—coal, natural gas and nuclear facilities—that consume
fresh water to cool and condense steam that drives power turbines, as well as hydroelectric dams in the
West).
136. Id.
137. ALISON SILVERSTEIN, ROB GRAMLICH & MICHAEL GOGGIN, A CUSTOMER-FOCUSED
FRAMEWORK FOR ELECTRIC SYSTEM RESILIENCE 53–56 (2018), https://gridprogress.files.word
press.com/2018/05/customer-focused-resilience-final-050118.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4ZA-UJM9].
138. See Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52
AM. ECON. REV. 1052, 1066–67 (1962) (explaining concerns in the context of communications
common carriers).
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options available to a utility.139 Just as important is the need to consider the
interplay between long-term planning, reliability, and climate change, as certain
measures can magnify adaptation challenges.
For example, extreme heat during 2021 increased the demand for air
conditioning, and in many areas of the country the short-term utility response
to expanding power supply output resulted in an increase in emissions from
fossil fuel plants.140 Similarly, in anticipation of demand growth due to vehicle
electrification, utilities need to be mindful of climate impacts.141 This pattern,
where solution addresses symptom while concurrently exacerbating the
underlying condition, should be avoided. In planning to meet the demand for
energy, grid operators must proactively approach power supply with an eye
towards climate impacts and must aim to prevent “maladaptation.”142 This
requires a utility to focus not only on the immediate challenge of keeping
customers’ lights on, but also on finding longer-term ways to address system
resilience, including reducing peaks in energy demand, promoting conservation,
and building new low-carbon power supply capacity.143
B.

Obligations of the Private Law Duty To Adapt

For energy grid operators, there is considerable evidence that a range of
harms connected to climate change are widely known throughout the industry,
supporting judicial recognition of a general duty to adapt obligating public

139. See, e.g., CONSOL. EDISON, CLIMATE CHANGE RESILIENCE AND ADAPTATION: SUMMARY
2020 ACTIVITIES 34–41 (2021), https://www.coned.com/-/media/files/coned/documents/ourenergy-future/our-energy-project/climate-change-resiliency-plan/climate-change-resilience-adaption2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/3USY-6UK4] (describing several low-cost planning, design, and
emergency response strategies that are available to Consolidated Edison as it faces an increased
likelihood of extreme climate events).
140. Benjamin Storrow, How Heat Waves and AC Propel a Climate Feedback Loop, E&ENEWS (June
28, 2021, 6:42 AM), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2021/06/28/stories/1063735921?utm_
campaign=edition&utm_medium=email&utm_source=eenews%3Aclimatewire [https://perma.cc/NN
Y6-QAE7 (staff-uploaded, dark archive)] (noting that a narrow focus on reliability may lead grid
operators to keep operating less efficient, dirtier fossil fuel plants, only to run them during heat waves,
raising the risks to the climate).
141. For a discussion of the challenges in shifting toward electrification without adversely
impacting climate emissions, see generally Alexandra B. Klass, Public Utilities and Transportation
Electrification, 104 IOWA L. REV. 545 (2019).
142. Maladaptation occurs where regulatory interventions “address the symptom of a particular
risk while also exacerbating its underlying cause”—a policy result that should generally be avoided. See
EDF & Sabin Comments, supra note 112, Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.at 8 (quoting WEBB
ET AL., supra note 10, at 4).
143. See J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Legal Systems—
with Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1373, 1393–402 (2011) (emphasizing
the need for adaptive systems to proactively engineer for resilience in order to restore disturbances
from system equilibrium).
OF
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utilities to make operational and planning decisions in a manner that accounts
for changing conditions in light of climate change.
There is also considerable evidence of practices that can mitigate these
risks, supporting a more precise enunciation of the utility’s duty to adapt in
relation to the three constituent obligations of the duty to provide adequate
service, encompassed in the duty to serve: providing reasonable interruption
notice, minimizing outages, and meeting technical standards in operation of the
grid. We demonstrate these foreseeable harms and feasible risk mitigation
strategies in turn, considering each in the context of three recent energy outages
to aid inquiry: the 2021 Texas winter storms; 2012 Hurricane Sandy in New
York; and the 2007, 2017, and 2018 wildfires in California. Whether a duty has
been breached in a particular context is ultimately still a question of fact left to
a jury, but we draw on these examples to show that the industry has a range of
feasible options to mitigate ongoing climate adaptation risks with the power
grid.
1. “Adequate” Notice of Interruption
In the second week of February 2021, extreme winter weather conditions
affected the middle of the country.144 Record low temperatures and snow and
ice that lasted for days produced a major power crisis in Texas, with rolling
blackouts across the state over a period of several days.145 The impact of these
blackouts was devastating. Seventy percent of Texans served by the state’s
power grid lost power for an average of forty-two hours, with more than half of
those experiencing a loss of access to other critical services, such as water.146
Dozens (according to some reports, hundreds) of individuals are reported to
have died for reasons connected to the energy outages.147 The outages resulted
in significant property and economic losses throughout the entire state, ranging
in impact from $80 to $130 billion with insured losses estimated at $10 to $20
billion.148

144. See Kara Norton, Why Texas Was Not Prepared for Winter Storm Uri, PBS (Mar. 25, 2021),
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/texas-winter-storm-uri/ [https://perma.cc/VMT8-3P5G].
145. Id.
146. Neelam Bohra, Almost 70% of ERCOT Customers Lost Power During Winter Storm, Study Finds,
TEXAS TRIB. (Mar. 29, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/03/29/texas-poweroutage-ERCOT/ [https://perma.cc/34CH-XS9R].
147. See Zach Despart, Alejandro Serrano & Stephanie Lamm, Analysis Reveals Nearly 200 Died in
Texas Cold Storm and Blackouts, Almost Double the Official Count, HOUS. CHRON. (Apr. 2, 2021, 4:40
PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/texas-cold-storm-200died-analysis-winter-freeze-16070470.php [https://perma.cc/8WY8-U9RT].
148. Garrett Golding, Anil Kumar & Karel Mertes, Cost of Texas’ 2021 Deep Freeze Justifies
Weatherization, FED. RSRV. BANK DALL. (Apr. 15, 2021), https://www.dallasfed.org/research/
economics/2021/0415.aspx [https://perma.cc/URW9-X9EF].
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The causes of the tragic power outages in Texas in the winter of 2021 are
complex. At bottom, record-breaking winter demand for electric power could
not meet supply, at a time when power plant equipment was frozen due to
record-setting low temperatures throughout the entire state.149 At the peak of
the power outages, over forty-eight percent of the region’s total power
generation capacity was unavailable, with every type of generation technology
facing some problems.150 Gas-fired generators (which suffered greater outages
than other power generation technologies) faced pervasive fuel shortages when
the compressors necessary to supply gas via pipeline were disabled by a
combination of freezing weather and the lack of power.151 The extreme winter
weather in February 2021 was not unique to Texas (other parts of the country
faced freezing conditions too), but there are a number of reasons the state’s
power grid was hit particularly hard by it. While adjacent states participate in
interconnected national transmission grids, Texas has isolated most of its
transmission grid and placed it under the control of the Electricity Reliability
Council of Texas (“ERCOT”), allowing operation of most of the state’s electric
power industry to avoid federal oversight.152 Unlike every other region of the
United States with a central energy grid operator, Texas does not have a
mandatory centralized capacity market administrated by the grid operator nor
a state-supervised least-cost planning process to ensure sufficient energy
supply.153 Rather, the state’s “energy only” power supply approach within
ERCOT relies exclusively on market price signals to create incentives for
generation resources to be available when there are power shortages.154 Texas
also lacks reliability standards that directly require generators to perform
winterization (a contrast to many other regions of the United States prone to
freezing), leaving the state’s power supply particularly vulnerable to cold
weather.155 With power demand peaking and nearly half the state’s power plants

149. BILL MAGNESS, REVIEW OF FEBRUARY 2021 EXTREME COLD WEATHER EVENT—
ERCOT PRESENTATION 10 (Feb. 24, 2021), http://www.ercot.com/content/wcm/key_documents
_lists/225373/2.2_REVISED_ERCOT_Presentation.pdf [https:/perma.cc/UTQ2-5M4H].
150. Id.
151. Id. at 14.
152. Stephanie Kelly, Tim McLaughlin & Swati Verma, Explainer: Texas’s One of a Kind Power
System Raises Questions During Price Spike, REUTERS (Feb. 16, 2021, 4:43 PM), https://www.reuters.com
/article/us-usa-weather-power-prices-explainer/explainer-texass-one-of-a-kind-power-system-raisesquestions-during-price-spike-idUSKBN2AG2KD [https://perma.cc/N835-J7V5].
153. Id.
154. Id. (noting that since 2010 reserve margins in the state had dropped “to about 10% from about
20%”).
155. See Jim Krane, Robert Idel & Peter Volkmar, Winterization and the Texas Blackout: Fail To
Prepare? Prepare To Fail, FORBES (Feb. 19, 2021, 10:55 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
thebakersinstitute/2021/02/19/winterization-and-the-texas-blackout-fail-to-prepare-prepare-to-fail/?s
h=693f0a5d7c83 [https://perma.cc/FT7W-NPUJ].
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out of operation, Texas grid operators had no choice but to institute rolling
blackouts for most customers, as the Texas power grid was “‘seconds and
minutes’ away from” complete failure.156 These rolling blackouts helped the
state preserve the safety of its grid by avoiding fires and unsafe operating
conditions.157
The 2021 Texas blackout was an avoidable disaster, and in fact, it has been
described as a “disaster foretold.”158 Over and over again, for more than a
decade, Texas regulators, ERCOT, and participants in the Texas power market
were warned that the state’s power grid was vulnerable to reliability
disruptions.159 As one expert testified to Congress, “[i]t is clear that steps could
have been taken by state officials, grid operators and energy asset owners in
Texas that would have at least lessened the extent of power system and gas
system outages, and the human hardships that resulted from them.”160 Over
several years, NERC had warned that ERCOT was operating with narrow
power reserve margins and with reliability risks.161 The event itself was likewise
not without precedent: in February 2011, ERCOT had experienced difficulties
maintaining reliable electric service during extreme weather conditions due to
freezing instrumentation and equipment; following these outages a decade ago,
a report issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) and
NERC called the winter outages “avoidable” and made several
recommendations, including the need for the industry and regulators to be
156. Erin Douglas, Texas Was “Seconds and Minutes” Away from Catastrophic Monthslong Blackouts,
Officials Say, TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 18, 2021, 6:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/18/texaspower-outages-ercot/ [https://perma.cc/LYS4-QGBE].
157. Id.
158. Jeffrey Ball, The Texas Blackout Is the Story of a Disaster Foretold, TEX. MONTHLY (Feb. 19,
2021), https://www.texasmonthly.com/news-politics/texas-blackout-preventable/ [https://perma.cc/L
W2R-UVRU].
159. Megan Hernboth, At Least Two Lawsuits Filed Against Texas’ Energy Committee Claim It Was
Aware of Shortcomings in the State’s Energy Supply from Previous Winter Storms, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 20,
2021, 11:49 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/lawsuits-filed-against-texas-energy-committeefor-outages-2021-2 [https://perma.cc/8LR6-GTP3].
160. Lessons Learned from the Texas Blackouts: Research Needs for a Secure and Resilient Grid: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Sci., Space & Tech., 117th Cong. 69 (2021) (statement of Susan F. Tierney,
Senior Advisor, Analysis Group, Inc.), https://www.congress.gov/117/chrg/CHRG-117hhrg43633/
CHRG-117hhrg43633.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6X6-K2YH (staff-uploaded archive)].
161. Reliability, Resiliency, and Affordability of Electric Service in the U.S. amid the Changing Energy
Mix and Extreme Weather Events: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Energy & Nat. Res., 117th Cong. 8
(2021) (statement of James Robb, President and CEO of NERC), https://www.energy.senate.
gov/services/files/EB1D7E02-BC93-4DFF-A6A9-002341DA34CF [https://perma.cc/PPK8-RM4R]
(“Concern for ERCOT’s reserve margins has been a standing concern in NERC’s assessments. In the
most recent 2020/2021 Winter Reliability Assessment, NERC warns of the potential for extreme
generation resource outages in ERCOT due to severe weather in winter and summer, and the potential
need for grid operators to employ operating mitigations or energy emergency alerts to meet peak
demand.”).
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attentive to weatherization of power plants.162 The FERC/NERC report
following the February 2011 outages recommended too that ERCOT should
obtain “forecasts of real output capability [from power suppliers] in advance of
an anticipated severe weather event,” which “should take into account both the
temperature beyond which the availability of the generating unit cannot be
assumed, and the potential for natural gas curtailments.”163 As FERC has
reported following its investigation of the winter 2021 Texas outage, this was
the fourth event in a decade that threatened the reliability of the Texas grid due
to unplanned cold-weather-related power generation outages.164
The impacts of these outages were devastating. Texas power customers
experienced prolonged periods of freezing in their homes, resulting in
significant property damage related to freezing pipes and flooding and, in some
unfortunate cases, death.165 As a result, a number of lawsuits have been filed
against ERCOT and power suppliers in the state,166 including suits on behalf of
vulnerable individuals who died due to hypothermia when heat was unavailable
in their homes.167 These suits against energy operators raise a range of issues,
but several suits have focused on the adequacy of notice regarding service
outage. For example, the mother of an eleven-year-old boy who died of
hypothermia while sleeping during the winter storms sued ERCOT and the
local utility, Entergy, alleging that misinformation and inaccuracies in
communications with customers led to confusion during the storm and
needlessly exposed customers to dangerous weather conditions.168 Specifically,
the suit alleges, while ERCOT and Entergy warned customers of temporary,
162. FERC & NERC, REPORT ON OUTAGES AND CURTAILMENTS DURING THE SOUTHWEST
COLD WEATHER EVENT OF FEBRUARY 1–5, 2011: CAUSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 203 (2011),
https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/08-16-11-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/CJ8Q-8HSN]
(“States in the Southwest should examine whether Generator/Operators ought to be required to submit
winterization plans, and should consider enacting legislation where necessary and appropriate.”).
163. Id. at 202.
164. FERC & NERC, FEBRUARY 2021 COLD WEATHER GRID OPERATIONS:
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (2021), https://www.ferc.gov/february-2021cold-weather-grid-operations-preliminary-findings-and-recommendations [https://perma.cc/3XBF-5
UD7 (staff-uploaded archive)].
165. Ball, supra note 158.
166. See, e.g., Boose, supra note 7; Plaintiff’s Petition and Application, supra note 7. Although
ERCOT routinely raises a sovereign immunity defense when faced with such lawsuits, the Texas
Supreme Court recently punted on making a decision about this issue, leaving the question of sovereign
immunity open for the time being under Texas law and ERCOT open to tort suits. See ERCOT v.
Panda Power Generation Infrastructure Fund, LLC, 619 S.W.3d 628, 631 (Tex. 2021).
167. Giulia McDonnell Nieto del Rio, Richard Fausset & Johnny Diaz, Extreme Cold Killed Texans
in Their Bedrooms, Vehicles and Backyards, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/19/us/texasdeaths-winter-storm.html [https://perma.cc/3SYW-4XNZ (dark archive)] (Sept. 1, 2021).
168. Doha Madani, Mother of 11-Year-Old Texas Boy Who Died During Power Outage Sues ERCOT,
Entergy, NBC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2021, 6:05 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/mother-11year-old-texas-boy-who-died-during-power-n1258564 [https://perma.cc/4KMX-DYPQ].
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rolling blackouts (which might last for a period of twenty to thirty-four
minutes), it failed to warn customers that there might be longer blackouts that
would last for days—and that grid operators had sufficient information to know
that blackouts for some customers would be longer.169 The suit also maintains
that the local utility chose which circuits to shut down in a manner that
disproportionately impacted some of the most vulnerable customers, while
allowing businesses in certain areas to operate without any power interruption
at all.170
Negligence claims alleging inadequate notice demonstrate one way that a
duty to adapt can help hold utilities accountable on an ongoing basis for
mitigating the risks of operating the energy grid during extreme climate events.
Utility regulators routinely require “reasonably adequate notice” of service
disconnection, but it is unclear what “reasonably adequate” entails. Over time,
what is required for adequate notice has changed, especially as more widespread
use of forecasting coupled with the use of real-time information and big data by
energy grid operators has allowed for more granular forecasting of service
outages. No one else has access to this kind of specific information about the
power grid’s operation—and a utility, not a customer, is in the best position to
know whether it will suffer temporary rolling blackouts or more sustained
outages that might require customers to seek alternatives to using electricity in
their homes.171 More pervasive interconnection to customers through the
telecommunications network also changes societal expectations for how service
outages should be communicated. Most basically, with widespread use of cell
phones and the internet as communication tools, utilities are also able to deliver
information regularly to customers and provide updates about service outages
in real time to customers without incurring a significant cost. Many customers
even have advanced smart meters that allow utilities to exercise a granular level
of control over power supply by controlling the flow of energy not only at the
level of distribution switches that may affect neighbors but also at the level of
the individual customer.172 At a minimum, the availability of these technologies
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Cf. David Montgomery, Rick Rojas, Ivan Penn & James Dobbins, Through Chattering Teeth,
Texans Criticize Extended Power Outages, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/16/us/texaswinter-storm-power-outages.html [https://perma.cc/FL2B-67YV (dark archive)] (Feb. 18, 2021).
172. For example, just months after the winter 2021 rolling blackouts, Texas utilities
communicated with customers about voluntary conservation of energy to relieve the strain on the state’s
power grid during extreme summer heat. Eric Levenson, Electric Grid Operator Asks Texans To Stop
Blasting AC as Unplanned Outages and Heat Collide, CNN (June 15, 2021, 11:42 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/15/us/texas-ercot-heat-energy/index.html [https://perma.cc/3NK6-WJ
44]. Some utilities in the state deployed smart meters to limit customer energy use to reduce demand
associated with home air conditioner operation. See Matt Dougherty, ‘Woke Up Sweating’: Some Texans
Shocked To Find Their Smart Thermostats Were Raised Remotely, KHOU, https://www.khou.com/article/
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would suggest an obligation not just to provide some notice of interruption but
also to provide regular and accurate updates about expected outage duration and
service restoration. In addition, utility operators have obligations to warn
customers about related risks associated with power outages and to provide
information relevant to mitigating these risks, such as warnings about traffic
signal outages, exposure to extreme weather conditions, and impacts on water
and safe shelter—all of which were implicated by the 2021 winter power outages
in Texas.
2. Minimizing Unnecessary Power Outages
The duty to serve obligates public utilities to take reasonable measures to
minimize unnecessary power outages. This includes an obligation to take
feasible ongoing operational measures and to take longer-term measures to
better plan the grid to minimize outages where reasonable. However, it does
not require perfect reliability of service for customers, especially where utilities
are having dangerous extreme weather events. Although the statutory duty to
serve is often oriented with conceptions of reliability in mind, the private duty
to serve is not tethered to historic conceptions of reliability alone. Rather, and
of particular relevance in addressing harms associated with climate change, it
includes an obligation to take into account considerations more aptly described
as energy resilience, including the grid’s ability to recover safely and quickly
when confronted with emergencies such as those represented by extreme
weather events.173
The 2021 Texas winter power outages demonstrate how the proactive
deployment of feasible operational measures can help to minimize outages. A
decade prior to the 2021 winter storms, grid operators and power suppliers in
Texas warned about some specific operational and design risks that made the
state’s power grid especially vulnerable to winter storm outages.174 FERC and
NERC specifically recommended generators weatherize equipment.175 There is
no evidence that power suppliers or utilities in much of the state made
significant changes to their operations in response to previous calls for power
plant weatherization or the use of predictive forecasting techniques to harden
the grid in order to improve reliability. To the extent that grid operators failed
to take feasible measures to respond to particular, previously identified risks,
news/local/texas/remote-thermostat-adjustment-texas-energy-shortage/285-5acf2bc5-54b7-4160-bffe1f9a5ef4362a [https://perma.cc/Y9G5-AJWX] (June 18, 2021, 9:42 AM).
173. For further discussion of the challenges with transmission grid resilience, see generally
PRESTON ET AL., supra note 134.
174. See supra notes 161–64 and accompanying text (describing FERC/NERC recommendations
to the Texas power industry).
175. See supra notes 161–64.
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plaintiffs would appear to have a solid basis for raising a failure-to-adapt claim
against ERCOT and distribution utilities. As discussed more below in Section
II.B.3, similar claims, premised on a general duty of care, could also be brought
against power suppliers or natural gas companies for the foreseeable harms that
their operations caused to noncustomer victims during the winter 2021 outages.
The obligation to minimize outages not only includes operational
decisions by utilities and energy suppliers; it also extends to a utility’s planning
and design of the grid. It does not depend on a specific prior warning of a
particular weather event, as occurred in Texas. Rather, the obligation is oriented
in particular to energy resilience benefits made possible through incorporation
of climate science. Through climate resilience planning, public utilities can
uncover specific and actionable information that results in changes across
operational, planning, and investment decisions. These changes, which are
owed under the duty to adapt, improve energy resilience in response to climate
change impacts, and ultimately connect back to the duty to serve’s obligation
that public utilities minimize unnecessary power outages.
Importantly too, the obligation may require utilities to undertake careful
balancing of equities. A utility might, for example, shut off power for limited
durations for some customers in order to manage and maintain grid resilience.176
Increasingly, the need to de-energize portions of the grid in the face of extreme
weather events in order to protect system resilience and the safety of
customers177 raises the possibility that the duty to adapt may require not only
keeping the power on but also actual interruption of power for some customers
in order to maintain the overall integrity of the energy grid. It may require
utilities to consider even broader investments in resilience measures too, such
as battery storage and microgrids.178
Consider Hurricane Sandy, one of the most destructive extreme weather
events in recent history.179 In the United States, Sandy affected much of the
176. See PRESTON ET AL., supra note 134, at 7.
177. See, e.g., Ellen Howard Kutzer & Erun Overturf, Changing Climate, Changing Utilities: Extreme
Weather, Wildfires, Technology, and the Electric Grid, 35 NAT. RES. & ENV’T, Winter 2021, at 1 (noting
the use of service interruption as a risk mitigation tool but also that this can cause significant hardship
and even harm to some customers).
178. See, e.g., Herman K. Trabish, De-Energize and DERs: The Tough Options Wildfires
Pose for California Utilities, UTIL. DIVE (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/the-hardchoice-californias-wildfires-have-forced-on-its-utilities-and-a/548614/ [https://perma.cc/H8L6-GU
5C] (noting how customer distributed energy resources can help to improve system resilience); Kutzer
& Overturf, supra note 177, at 4–5 (discussing how distributed energy resources can help utilities better
manage wildfire risks).
179. See Sarah Gibbens, Hurricane Sandy, Explained, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 11, 2019), https://
www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/natural-disasters/reference/hurricane-sandy/#:~:text=In%
20the%20nine%20days%20that,costliest%20storms%20in%20U.S.%20history [https://perma.cc/N5TK
-3HQ6].
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East Coast, with a particularly severe impact on New York and New Jersey.180
In the days prior to Sandy, New York utility Consolidated Edison Company
(“Con. Ed.”) undertook several proactive measures to mitigate the risks of harm
from the storm.181 Power was shut off and lines were de-energized to protect
assets.182 Historic storm surges were reviewed, and the utility prepared for the
hurricane on the basis of that data.183
These preventative efforts proved insufficient. Before Sandy, the record
storm surge in New York City occurred in 1821, at a height of eleven feet.184 In
light of that historical marker, Con. Ed. built their system to withstand storm
surges of twelve-and-a-half feet.185 Sandy, however, “created a fourteen-foot
storm surge that flooded into the East River substation and destroyed
underground equipment, leaving about 250,000 customers without power.”186
In total, the hurricane left over a million Con. Ed. customers, roughly one-third
of the utility’s service population, without power.187 In the aftermath of Sandy,
“[r]estoring power required replacement of 140 miles of electric cable and
investigation of damages at 30,000 locations. In a single week, Con. Ed.
exhausted a supply of utility poles and transformers that normally would have
lasted for six months.”188 For some customers, it would take as many as two
weeks to restore electrical service.189
Did this event implicate a duty to adapt for Con. Ed.? Central to this
inquiry is what defines Con. Ed.’s obligation to minimize outages. The duty to
serve obligates the utility to provide “safe, continuous, comfortable, and
efficient service.”190 Again, this is not an expectation of perfect reliability but
instead an obligation to use “reasonable diligence and care towards its
customers”191—a standard of negligence, not strict liability. The duty to adapt
would impose an ongoing obligation on a utility to minimize unnecessary
outages in the context of climate change through reliability standards, planning,
and protocols, as well as emerging industry standards that focus on grid
resilience. Thus, the duty to adapt includes a constituent obligation to ensure

180. Id.
181. James M. Van Nostrand, Keeping the Lights on During Superstorm Sandy: Climate Change
Adaptation and the Resiliency Benefits of Distributed Generation, 23 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 92, 101 (2015).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 101–02.
188. Id. at 102.
189. Id.
190. The Duty of a Public Utility, supra note 22, at 313.
191. National Food Stores Comment, supra note 62, at 346 n.12.
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relevant reliability standards, protocols, and resilience plans that incorporate
reasonably available climate science.
If applied today to a weather event akin in destructive force to Hurricane
Sandy, a duty to adapt would require a markedly different approach than the
preparation made by Con. Ed. in the days preceding Sandy. At minimum, base
reliability planning for the grid that uses historic storm surge data that does not
incorporate the impacts of climate change would be unlikely to provide a
reasonably accurate predictor of extreme weather risks and would impede
resilience efforts.
Importantly, the steps a public utility could take consistent with what the
duty to adapt requires here are not theoretical. Con. Ed.’s actions immediately
following Sandy demonstrate in practical, implementable terms how better
planning and operational choice can mitigate the climate-adaption risks
associated with power system outages. In the aftermath of Sandy, New York
State’s Public Service Commission required Con. Ed. to conduct a climate
change vulnerability study.192 In doing so, the utility employed the best
available climate science and probabilistic modeling, considering a range of
potential climate change scenarios, to identify climate risk vulnerabilities
particular to the utility.193 The study found that climate change was shaping and
will continue to shape New York’s weather in a myriad of ways relevant to Con.
Ed.194 Its findings were specific, granular, and comprehensive, ranging from
findings on temperature increase (heat waves are projected to occur up to
twenty-five times more frequently) to precipitation (expected to increase up to
fifteen percent) to flooding (expected to increase by roughly fifty percent) to
extreme weather (stronger hurricanes and cyclones noted in particular).195
The vulnerability study identified a number of ways in which
consideration of climate change impacts could be incorporated into reliability
standards, planning, and protocols to help minimize unnecessary outages.196 The
study also identified a need for planning that goes beyond focusing on reliability
to include resilience in order to better incorporate these findings into utility
operations.197 Recommended actions to address these risks include improved
anti-flood measures (and in particular updated flood maps that account for sea
level rise), improved resource adequacy planning (higher temperatures and
192. See WEBB ET AL., supra note 10, at 13.
193. CONSOL. EDISON, CLIMATE CHANGE VULNERABILITY STUDY 17–19 (2019), https://www.
coned.com/-/media/files/coned/documents/our-energy-future/our-energy-projects/climate-changeresiliency-plan/climate-change-vulnerability-study.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/32QM-SGVZ].
194. Id. at 19–25.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 25.
197. Id.
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humidity drive electrical demand and decrease generation efficiency), updated
extreme weather protocols (customer outages were underpredicted in such
instances by an order of magnitude), reformed emergency preparedness and
recovery strategies, and increased demand-side efforts (including distributed
generation, energy storage, automated metering infrastructure, further support
to energy efficiency programs, and encouraged on-site generation and
microgrids).198
These findings and conclusions help to clarify and inform an ongoing duty
to adapt in the operation and planning of the power grid. Specifically, the duty
to serve’s constituent obligation to minimize unnecessary outages includes a
utility requirement to meet relevant reliability standards and protocols and to
address grid resilience in a manner that incorporates reasonably available
climate science.
3. Modifying/Updating Technical Standards
Wildfires create significant risk to utility assets and operations, and
attribution science has found that climate change “exacerbates wildfire risk
through hotter and drier conditions.”199 As temperatures and periods of drought
increase, wildfire season will expand in certain parts of the United States,
potentially shifting from a fall-specific risk to a year-round one.200 This trend is
already emerging, with the number of high-fire-potential days increasing “since
the early 2000s.”201 Climate science predicts that “these trends are likely to
continue and worsen into the future.”202
Wildfires pose new challenges not only to utility efforts to minimize
outages, but to meeting technical standards and best practices. In particular,
wildfires implicate a utility’s provision of safe service, insofar as utility
equipment can be the direct ignition of a wildfire.203 A “reasonable worst-case
scenario” includes, among other things, injuries and fatalities to the public,
employees, and contractors, property damage, damage to utility assets, and
impairment of reliability.204
198. Id. at 32–55.
199. Michael Burger, Jessica Wentz & Radley Horton, The Law and Science of Climate Change
Attribution, 45 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 57, 121 (2020).
200. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co.’s (U 902 E) Wildfire Mitigation Plan at 15, In re San Diego Gas
& Elec. Co., No. R.18-10-007 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Feb. 6, 2019) [hereinafter 2019 Wildfire
Mitigation Plan Filing], https://www.sdge.com/sites/default/files/regulatory/R.18-10-007%20SDG
%26E%20Wildfire%20Mitigation%20Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/57XD-7LLE].
201. Id. at 51.
202. Id. at 16, 52.
203. See PG&E Confesses to Killing 84 People in 2018 California Fire as Part of Guilty Plea, GUARDIAN
(June 16, 2020, 3:30 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/jun/16/pge-californiawildfire-camp-fire-paradise-guilty-plea [https://perma.cc/Q99D-TX5X].
204. 2019 Wildfire Mitigation Plan Filing, supra note 200, at 16.
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In 2007, California utility San Diego Gas & Electric’s (“SDG&E”) assets
caused a series of major wildfires in its service territory.205 In the fall of that
year, three significant wildfires occurred in succession: the Rice Fire, Witch
Fire, and Guejito Fire.206 The Rice Fire began in Fallbrook, California, started
by a tree branch falling upon and subsequently breaking SDG&E overhead
conductors.207 The Witch Fire was caused by a collision between two overhead
conductors during unusually strong Santa Ana Winds.208 The Guejito Fire was
traced to contact between a communications wire and SDG&E conductor.209
Preventative measures to reduce the likelihood of wildfires exist, such as
tree trimming, ensuring sufficient clearance for equipment, and de-energizing
distribution lines. However, in the case of SDG&E in 2007, these preventative
measures proved to be insufficient. The wildfires resulted in substantial
damage, cumulatively leading to roughly 200,000 acres burned, 1,300 homes
destroyed, 40 injuries and 2 deaths.210 The California Consumer Protection and
Safety Division (“CPSD”) alleged the utility acted negligently with respect to
all three fires, which SDG&E denied.211
Does a duty to adapt encompass circumstances such as these, where a
utility’s equipment and operation contributed to harm? In California, there is
no question that liability for injury suffered by property owners who suffered
losses does exist, albeit not through the application of a duty to adapt. Under
the California Constitution, the state uniquely applies a doctrine of inverse
condemnation to electric utilities, which effectively results in strict liability for
any wildfire caused by utility equipment.212 This doctrine has been particularly

205. Decision Denying Application at 2, In re San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., Dec. No. 17-11-033
(Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Dec. 6, 2017) [hereinafter Decision Denying Application], https://docs.cpuc.
ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M200/K045/200045020.PDF [https://perma.cc/ZK6K-84ZK]
(denying SDG&E’s application to the California Public Utilities Commission to recover costs related
to the 2007 wildfires).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 36.
208. Id. at 11–12.
209. Id. at 29.
210. Id. at 14; see also Rob Nikolewski, CPUC Rules Against SDG&E in 2007 Wildfire Case, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Nov. 30, 2017, 3:55 PM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/
business/energy-green/sd-fi-sdge-wildfirecaseruling-20171130-story.html [https://perma.cc/6M8B-M
RSY] [hereinafter Nikolewski, CPUC Rules].
211. See Decision Approving and Adopting the Witch/Rice and Guejito Fire Settlements at 10, In
re San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., Dec. No. 10-04-047 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Apr. 26, 2010), https://
docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/WORD_PDF/FINAL_DECISION/116945.PDF [https://perma.cc/
P5PP-T7VC] (approving a SDG&E settlement agreement in the wake of the 2007 wildfires).
212. COMM’N ON CATASTROPHIC WILDFIRE COST & RECOVERY, FINAL REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON CATASTROPHIC WILDFIRE COST AND RECOVERY 4 (June 17, 2019), https://opr.
ca.gov/docs/20190618-Commission_on_Catastrophic_Wildfire_Report_FINAL_for_transmittal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5QUC-SB6D]; see also Jeremy Gradwohl, Comment, Electric Utility-Caused Wildfire
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relevant in recent years, with another California utility, Pacific Gas & Electric
(“PG&E”), bearing liability for billions of dollars in devastation caused by
wildfires connected to its operations in 2017 and 2018.213 While other states may
have similar protections for the takings of property by public actors, strict
liability will rarely (if ever) apply to provide a meaningful remedy for harm
caused by private actors who operate the energy grid in other jurisdictions.
Rather, other jurisdictions consider allegations that a utility failed to meet
technical standards in operation or planning of the grid under a tort negligence
standard.214
Such a claim arose in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy. In Praetorian
Insurance Co. v. Long Island Power Authority,215 Plaintiffs alleged that a New York
state utility failed to de-energize its power lines in anticipation of the storm, a
reasonable step given the foreseeable impacts expected.216 The case, still
ongoing at the time of this writing, is premised upon a basic negligence violation
of the duty of care.217 Yet the court’s holding in denying defendant’s motion to
dismiss is relevant here. The court found that the utility’s duty extended to the
“exercise [of] reasonable care in the supply of electric service” and that it
obligated utility standards “commensurate with the inherent danger hidden in
its high voltage equipment.”218 Extreme weather impacts upon utility systems
will, as described above, increasingly emerge in the context of climate change.219
The safe operation and maintenance of the power system remains a core utility
obligation under the duty to serve. We believe the duty to adapt attaches to this
obligation and specifically obligates utilities to evaluate and update technical
standards on an ongoing basis to gird its assets and operations for the
foreseeable impacts of climate change.
Damages: Strict Liability Under Article I, Section 19 of the California Constitution, 92 TEMP. L. REV. 595,
596 (2020) (describing the California inverse condemnation approach as “unique”).
213. Decision Approving Proposed Settlement Agreement with Modifications at 2–3, In re Pac.
Gas & Elec. Co., Dec. No. 20-05-019 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n May 8, 2020), https://docs.cpuc.
ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M336/K236/336236538.pdf [https://perma.cc/FF3M-98JH]
(summarizing a settlement over harms from 2017 and 2018 wildfires caused by PG&E); see also Ivan
Penn, Lauren Hepler & Peter Eavis, PG&E Reaches $13.5 Billion Deal with Wildfire Victims, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/06/business/energy-environment/pge-wildfirevictims-deal.html [https://perma.cc/54ER-MH66 (dark archive)].
214. In some jurisdictions, the standard may be gross negligence, typically due to restrictions in
utility tariffs. For a discussion of this, see infra Section III.B.2.a.
215. No. 704580/2014, 2019 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2952 (Sup. Ct. Apr. 2, 2019).
216. Id. at *4.
217. Id.
218. Id. at *18.
219. See, e.g., Press Release, Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator, Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n & Cal. Energy
Comm’n, CAISO, CPUC, and CEC Issue Preliminary Report on Causes of August Rotating Outages
(Oct. 6, 2020), http://www.caiso.com/Documents/CAISO-CPUC-CEC-Issue-Preliminary-ReportCauses-August-Rotating-Outages.pdf [https://perma.cc/BE6G-PR96].
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If applied to a utility’s operations today, this constituent obligation of the
duty to adapt would require a substantially different approach than that which
SDG&E relied upon in 2007. Concerns were raised in the immediate aftermath
of the event around whether the utility met technical standards, particularly the
sufficiency of its preventative measures and vegetation management.220 The
utility’s actions following the 2007 wildfires illuminate how it has found feasible
ways to mitigate many wildfire risks. Today, SDG&E is considered an industry
leader in wildfire mitigation planning.221 In the span of fourteen years, the
utility has taken dramatic efforts to reduce wildfire risk in light of increasing
physical risks due to climate change.222 As reported in its annual Wildfire
Mitigation Plans, the utility has iteratively improved its technical capabilities
to prevent assets and operations from causing wildfires.223 The utility has
“developed an in-house meteorology team to forecast fire danger” and provided
that team with a “network of dense, utility-owned weather stations to provide
detailed weather data across the service territory.”224 The consequent data and
analysis are interwoven into the “day-to-day operational decision-making at all
levels of the company.”225 SDG&E developed its own modeling tool, the
Wildfire Risk Reduction Model, which creates probability distributions for
“ignitions rates by equipment type and external causes, fire growth potentials,

220. Nikolewski, CPUC Rules, supra note 210.
221. Unlike in the case of Con. Ed. and the NYPSC-mandated climate vulnerability assessment,
discussed in notes 192–95 and accompanying text, these efforts were not taken in response to CPUC
mandate. The utility itself expressly disavows any particular event as impetus for its work in the space.
However, and as explored above, the 2007 wildfires led to over 2,500 lawsuits against the utility,
ultimately resulting in a settlement which required it to pay $2.4 billion to injured individuals. Petition
for Writ of Certiorari at 5, 7, San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 140 S. Ct. 188
(2019) (cert. denied). SDG&E’s efforts to rate base this settlement were denied by the CPUC.
Decision Denying Application, supra note 205, at 2.
222. SAN DIEGO GAS & ELEC. CO., WILDFIRE MITIGATION PLAN 4 (Feb. 7, 2020) [hereinafter
2020 WILDFIRE MITIGATION PLAN], https://www.sdge.com/sites/default/files/regulatory/SDG%26
E%202020%20Wildfire%20Mitigation%20Plan%2002-07-2020_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/365J-TMDP];
see also David Roberts, 3 Key Solutions to California’s Wildfire Safety Blackout Mess, VOX (Oct. 22, 2019,
10:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/10/22/20916820/california-wildfireclimate-change-blackout-insurance-pge [https://perma.cc/9TZ7-M2PX].
223. Climate change frames these actions, with SDG&E noting that “[c]atastrophic wildfires,
driven by the change in climate and resulting extreme winds, have ignited in California with increased
frequency and severity in recent years.” 2020 WILDFIRE MITIGATION PLAN, supra note 222, at viii.
224. Id. SDG&E owns 177 weather stations, which provide readings of “wind speed, humidity, and
temperature in fire prone areas every 10 minutes.” News Release, San Diego Gas & Elec. Co.,
SDG&E’s 2019 Wildfire Mitigation Plan Builds on Past Successes To Further Strengthen Fire
Preparedness and Safety (Feb. 6, 2019), http://www.sdgenews.com/article/sdges-2019-wildfiremitigation-plan-builds-past-successes-further-strengthen-fire#:~:text=6%2C%202019%20%E2%80%93
%20As%20conversations%20about,fires%2C%20improve%20the%20resiliency%20of [https://perma.cc
/S3K9-T6EM].
225. 2020 WILDFIRE MITIGATION PLAN, supra note 222, at viii.
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and values at risk.”226 The Model permits simulations of wildfire risk “that can
be configured for all weather types, or specific weather patterns.”227 The utility
is beginning to incorporate data science into its vegetation management as well,
and plans to develop a “Vegetation Risk Index of the highest risk trees in its
service territory.”228 Additional SDG&E efforts include a drone-based
inspection program, regular safety inspections, deployment of LiDAR (light
detection and ranging) surveys, development of predictive modeling, and
installation of cameras throughout the more mountainous regions of its service
territory.229
SDG&E leverages its wildfire data and analysis to mitigate risk and
promote grid resilience. Some of these mitigation activities are multiyear
endeavors, such as establishing community resource centers, hardening electric
transmission and distribution, establishing work protocols implemented during
extreme conditions, increasing line undergrounding, and databasing trees
proximate to its infrastructure.230 Others are immediately implementable, such
as upgrading wood poles to fire-resistant steel poles, tree trimming, and
deploying backup generation to critical community infrastructure.231 When
conditions reach levels that the utility considers unsafe, it will affirmatively deenergize power lines, which it does more frequently than its peers.232
SDG&E’s actions provide an example of one set of measures that a utility
might take in approaching its duty to adapt and to furthering safe operation of
its system by considering the effects of climate change-amplified weather.
Climate resilience planning should typically be more holistic in nature,
however, as a focus on a singular set of climate risks may fail to consider the full
suite of risks faced and the potential for multithreat solutions. Still, SDG&E’s
efforts here impart important lessons relevant to the duty to adapt. In
particular, those efforts illustrate the importance of evaluating and updating
technical standards to gird assets and operations for the foreseeable impacts of
climate change. Just as the duty to serve requires a utility to constantly update
technical standards in light of the environment in which it operates, the duty to
adapt should similarly compel updates in light of what climate science makes
226. 2019 Wildfire Mitigation Plan Filing, supra note 200, at 18.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 44; 2020 WILDFIRE MITIGATION PLAN, supra note 222, at ix.
229. 2020 WILDFIRE MITIGATION PLAN, supra note 222, at 48–54, 58–59, 91–110; 2019 Wildfire
Mitigation Plan Filing, supra note 200, at 3, 31.
230. 2019 Wildfire Mitigation Plan Filing, supra note 200, at 1, 9, 22, 32, 41.
231. Id. at 40–41.
232. 2020 WILDFIRE MITIGATION PLAN, supra note 222, at viii; see also Rob Nikolewski, SDG&E
Turns in Its Wildfire Plan for 2019—and It’s Different than Other Power Companies in California, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB. (Feb. 7, 2019, 5:30 PM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/energygreen/sd-fi-sdge-wildfire-plan-20190207-story.html [https://perma.cc/3YMZ-5F8L (dark archive)].
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available. Such considerations may be particularly relevant where energy
infrastructure faces widespread damage due to climate-induced events, even
though it may comply with technical standards set decades ago—as may have
been the case with the collapse of transmission towers and resulting citywide
power outages in New Orleans associated with Hurricane Ida in 2021.233
Climate science imparts increasingly precise, downscaled, and accurate
information about future weather baselines and extreme weather probabilities.
In turn, baseline and extreme weather events become increasingly foreseeable,
with the impact of climate change-amplified weather measured in miles and
predicted (with varying degrees of confidence) years and months in advance.234
The subsequent work conducted by Con. Ed. and SDG&E is likewise indicative
of improvements in operational and planning practices that, at a minimum,
other energy grid operators have an obligation to consider. Climate resilience
planning generally has lagged far behind need, although indications suggest this
may be changing.235 As noted above, the ultimate question of whether a duty to
adapt has been breached is factual and requires a jury consideration on a caseby-case basis.236
In evaluating energy grid design and planning, basic negligence doctrines
related to industry custom are likely to come into play, especially where there
are private standards that can be used to establish a standard of care. To the
extent some existing industry custom (such as a custom of looking to historical
averages in planning) fails to recognize adaptation risks in energy grid planning,
this does not excuse a utility’s inaction or failure to take proactive operational

233. See Tim McLaughlin & Stephanie Kelly, Why Hurricane Ida Crippled the New Orleans Power
Grid, REUTERS (Sept. 4, 2021, 10:02 AM), https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/whyhurricane-ida-crippled-new-orleans-power-grid-2021-09-04/ [https://perma.cc/G6Y7-XSR5] (noting
that several of New Orleans utility Entergy’s transmission towers were designed to meet hurricane
wind standards from decades ago, not more recent and more rigorous technical standards).
234. See WEBB ET AL., supra note 10, at 5.
235. See Agreement and Stipulation of Settlement at 4–5, In re Duke Energy Progress, LLC, No.
E-2 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n July 9, 2020), https://starw1.ncuc.net/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=2bebd0aa03d9-4108-a105-6dfdfd455d49 [https://perma.cc/9JJN-EBC9] (memorializing a settlement agreement
between Duke Energy Progress, LLC, and Vote Solar in which Duke Energy agreed to convene a
Climate Resilience Working Group); Technical Conference To Discuss Climate Change, Extreme Weather,
& Electric System Reliability (Docket No. AD21-13-000), FERC, https://www.ferc.gov/newsevents/events/technical-conference-discuss-climate-change-extreme-weather-electric-system [https://
perma.cc/EA5F-3AHU] (Aug. 11, 2021).
236. For example, risk-utility analysis weighs “the burden of preventing injury” against “the
product of the magnitude of the injury and its likelihood,” requiring a jury to engage in predictive
analysis. Hunter & Salzman, Negligence in the Air, supra note 3, at 1756 (citing U.S. v. Carroll Towing
Co., 159 F.2d 169, 174 (2d Cir. 1947)). The foreseeability and degree of certainty of harm are explicit
factors that must be considered under such an approach; absent a plaintiff producing some evidence of
foreseeability, it is not uncommon for a claim to fail. See, e.g., Adams v. Bullock, 125 N.E. 93, 94 (N.Y.
1919).
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or planning measures. As Judge Learned Hand famously observed in T.J.
Hooper v. Northern Barge Corp.,237 “[T]here are precautions so imperative that
even their universal disregard will not excuse their omission.”238 As important,
while the failure to adhere to an existing industry practice to address risks may
not be negligence in and of itself, it is evidence of what is feasible, and it may
serve to establish emerging customs for addressing new forms of risk. Similarly,
to the extent existing customs fail to recognize adaptation risks in energy grid
planning, this should not excuse a utility’s inaction or failure to take proactive
operational or planning measures.239 Such an approach is particularly relevant
to assessing the obligations of the duty to adapt, since the industry’s
understanding of the climate adaptation risks associated with the energy grid
improves with each new extreme weather event, and climate science
increasingly allows for updated understandings of feasible ways to mitigate
these risks.
C.

To Whom the Duty Is Owed

A duty to adapt may appear uncontroversial when applied in some
contexts, but defining its scope can raise some difficult issues. It stands on its
firmest ground when applied to utility-customer claims, but we believe the duty
is best expressed as one that can also hold utilities accountable for foreseeable
harms to noncustomers in certain circumstances. Based on similar foreseeability
principles, the duty to adapt should also extend to claims against energy
providers who are not utilities.
There will rarely be a question of whether a duty to adapt is owed when
the plaintiff is a contracted customer with a defendant utility. More challenging
are those cases where utilities are subject to tort obligations beyond their
customers. Utilities are not liable without limitation under the duty to serve,
nor does recognition of a duty to adapt require that utilities owe an obligation
in tort to the world at large.240 As a basic principle of tort law, negligence is
relational and does not create absolute duties, but instead courts define the
scope of tort obligations in terms of the foreseeability of harm to a class of
237. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
238. Id. at 740.
239. See Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903) (noting that the negligence
inquiry of what ought to be done is based on reasonable prudence, rather than what is usually done).
In medical malpractice cases, where custom routinely sets the standard of care, some courts have been
willing to consider new, alternative treatments that mitigate the risks of harm under a reasonable person
standard. See, e.g., Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974) (finding ophthalmologist had
acted carelessly by not administering cheap, safe, and efficacious “pressure test” to detect glaucoma
under the reasonable person standard, even though the accepted custom at the time was to only use
this test for high-risk patients).
240. See infra Section III.B.1.
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individuals affected by a defendant’s risk-creating activities.241 As with other
negligence cases, notions of foreseeability and policy considerations provide
courts with important tools to tailor the scope of the constituent obligations of
the duty to adapt.242
Privity might be considered the starting point for a duty to adapt,
especially since contracts are frequently invoked to impose obligations on
utilities to serve their customers.243 Then-Judge Cardozo (in)famously invoked
privity to limit a water utility’s duty of care toward a noncustomer who suffered
losses in the form of property damage because of a fire that was not put out due
to a water outage caused by the utility’s negligence.244 The New York Court of
Appeals similarly referenced a privity bright-line rule in holding that a utility
owed no duty of care to a tenant injured in a common area of an apartment
building during a citywide blackout (leaving approximately three million Con.
Ed. customers without power) caused by the utility’s gross negligence.245 Citing
Judge Cardozo, the court reasoned that the lack of privity is not irrelevant to its
conclusion that no duty was owed; however, public policy concerns with
opening a liability floodgate for a large, undefined range of potential plaintiffs
was equally central to its result.246 Even though the utility’s obligation to
provide service to a customer is “rooted in contract,” the court recognized that
this obligation can still “engender a duty owed to those not in privity.”247 Duty
on the basis of privity between plaintiff and defendant is not a necessity for tort
liability, but instead a rough marker used to “limit the legal consequences of
wrongs to a controllable degree.”248 Ultimately, “an ability to extend the
defendant’s duty to cover specifically foreseeable parties but at the same time
to contain liability to manageable levels” is central to defining the scope of the
utility’s duty.249

241. For the general argument that the recognition of new duties in tort law based on a negligence
principle can help to induce safer conduct, see John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Accidents
of the Great Society, 64 MD. L. REV. 364, 368 (2005) (arguing for a relational notion of negligence,
which emphasizes a “loci of responsibility” grounded in duty).
242. See, e.g., id.
243. See supra notes 26–42 and accompanying text (discussing how the duty to serve is frequently
grounded in a utility’s tariff or its contract with a customer); see also Rossi, The “Duty To Serve” and
Protection of Consumers, supra note 42, at 1243 (discussing the obligation to provide notice of
disconnection).
244. H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 898–99 (N.Y. 1928). Judge Cardozo’s
reasoning in the case also infamously characterized the utility’s failure to provide water not as an
affirmative “force or instrument of harm” but as an example of omission or nonfeasance. Id. at 898.
245. See Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34, 36–38 (N.Y. 1985).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 36.
248. Id. (quoting Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424 (N.Y. 1969)).
249. Id. at 37.
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Judge Cardozo’s strict “limited duty” approach to noncustomer utility
liability based on privity is controversial. Despite an occasional reference, even
New York cases do not rely on or follow it as the primary basis for limiting the
scope of a utility’s obligations. The New York Court of Appeals has reasoned
that the lack of privity is not a barrier to a defendant owing a duty to “a known
and identifiable” group so long as the business functions being performed are
not directed to a “faceless or unlimited number of persons.”250 Other
jurisdictions also typically define the scope of duty with respect to a class of
foreseeable victims of the defendant’s conduct. Banks, for example, have been
held to owe a duty of care toward noncustomers suffering economic losses for
use of escrow funds251 or fraudulent use of a noncustomer’s name in opening an
account.252 Duties in tort for service loss can also extend to noncustomers. In
Goldberg v. Florida Power and Light,253 the Florida Supreme Court held that an
electric utility that shut off power to repair a line owed an obligation to a private
motorist who was harmed at a traffic intersection.254 In addition to recognizing
a duty, the court rejected the utility’s argument that proximate cause should
provide a bright-line basis for rejecting the claim, instead reasoning that
questions of intervening cause require fact-specific consideration by the trier of
fact.255 An earlier Florida case that defined a utility’s duty based on a foreseeable
zone-of-risk approach observed too that, though power companies “are not
insurers, they nevertheless must shoulder a greater-than-usual duty of care in
proportion to the greater-than-usual zone of risk associated with the business
enterprise they have undertaken”—particularly since “[e]lectricity has
unquestioned power to kill or maim.”256
These cases are best understood as an application of tort law’s longstanding
principle that a duty is owed to a plaintiff who is the member of a specifically

250. Palka v. Servicemaster Mgmt. Servs. Corp., 634 N.E.2d 189, 195 (N.Y. 1994) (allowing a
hospital employee to sue a contractor who negligently installed a fan that fell and injured her, even
though she was not specifically identified in the contract). Relevant factors include “reasonably
interconnected and anticipated relationships; particularity of assumed responsibility under the contract
and evidence adduced at trial; displacement and substitution of a particular safety function designed to
protect persons like this plaintiff; and a set of reasonable expectations of all the parties.” Id. at 194–95.
251. See Chang v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 845 F.3d 1087, 1097 (11th Cir. 2017) (describing how a
noncustomer of bank who advanced escrow funds for a prospective borrowers’ commercial loan was
allowed to sue a bank for negligence, on the ground that the bank owed a duty of reasonable care to
monitor against misappropriation of escrow funds).
252. See Patrick v. Union St. Bank, 681 So. 2d 1364, 1371 (Ala. 1996) (holding that a bank owed a
duty of care to a person in whose name an account was opened to ensure that the person opening an
account is not an imposter).
253. 899 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 2005).
254. See id. at 1113.
255. See id. at 1117–18.
256. McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500, 504 (Fla. 1992).
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foreseeable class of individuals.257 In Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad,258 Judge
Cardozo famously identified negligence as a “term of relation” that ultimately
hinged on whether an accident victim faced “possibilities of danger so many and
apparent” as to create an obligation that is special to her.259 Under his majority
opinion, a duty would be triggered where “the eye of vigilance perceives the
risk of damage,” but not where no hazard is “apparent to the eye of ordinary
vigilance.”260 For Judge Cardozo, “the orbit of the danger as disclosed to the eye
of reasonable vigilance would be the orbit of the duty.”261 Ultimately, the scope
of the defendant’s duty hinges on questions of the foreseeability of harm to the
victim of an activity in the general factual context in which the accident arose—
not with respect to a bright-line, noncontextual notion of contract, privity of
interest, or the proximity of relationship. This depends on a degree of certainty
to which harms to a specific set of persons can reasonably be identified.262 A
court ultimately will make this determination of the “orbit” of duty as a matter
of law, though this legal determination is mindful of factual context related to
risks toward specific persons associated with the allegedly tortious activity that
caused the harm.
The trend among recent courts may well be toward recognizing a
presumptive duty of care in negligence. Still, to the extent that courts consider
negligence as a relational concept, the duty to adapt’s extension of utility
obligations cannot be so ill-defined as to create liability to the world at large.
We think that a limiting principle exists: an energy grid operator owes a duty
to adapt to a limited and identifiable class of foreseeable victims as it evaluates
and updates its technical standards to gird assets and operations for the
foreseeable impacts of climate change. By expanding potential plaintiffs here,
only with respect to the constituent obligation of meeting technical standards,
we believe these conceptions embedded in foreseeability are met. In particular,
unlike with notice and interruption, harm emanates here from equipment.
Concerns of limitless liability, like that expressed by the New York Court of

257. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 1733, 1821 (1998); cf. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1054 (N.Y. 1916) (holding
that a duty is owed to an individual if the injury is foreseeable to that individual).
258. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
259. Id. at 101.
260. Id. at 99–100. Judge Andrew’s dissenting opinion conceives of an even more expansive form
of the duty of care, “imposed on each one of us to protect society from unnecessary danger, not to
protect A, B, or C alone.” Id. at 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 100 (majority opinion).
262. Id. at 101. For Judge Andrews, who defines the duty more broadly, these questions of
foreseeability would remain relevant, though primarily as jury questions related to breach of duty. See
id. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
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Appeals in Strauss, are thus avoided, and instead this potential class of plaintiffs
is definable and discernable.
D.

Mapping the Duty To Adapt

We now present a typology (Figure 2) that elaborates with some
specificity upon the obligations for public utilities under a duty to adapt. We
retain the primary elements of the duty-to-serve typology presented in the
previous part, adding only a new column to extend the application of the duty
to adapt to each particular obligation.
Figure 2. Duty To Adapt—Typology
Duty-To-Serve
Obligations

“Adequate”
Notice of
Interruption

Minimizing
Unnecessary
Outages

Modifying/
Updating
Technical
Standards

Application to Duty
To Adapt
Reasonable notice
provided of
foreseeable service
interruptions
associated with
impending weather
events.
Reasonable notice
provided of changed
service protocols
associated with
impending weather
events.
Regularly incorporate
reasonably available
climate science into
relevant reliability
standards, protocols,
and planning, and
address energy
system resilience
measures.
Evaluate and update
technical standards
based on industry
practices to gird
assets and operations
for the foreseeable
impacts of climate
change.

To Whom
Owed

Primary Remedies263
1. Regulatory enforcement
(through applicable standards
and enforcement)

Current
customers

Current
customers
and
identifiable
class of
foreseeable
victims
Limited
and
identifiable
class of
foreseeable
victims

2. Private enforcement
(through contract and tort
claims)

1. Regulatory proceedings,
through utility service
standards (and accompanying
penalties for violation)
2. Private enforcement
(through contract and tort
claims)
1. Regulatory enforcement
(through applicable standards
and enforcement)
2. Private enforcement
(through contract and tort
claims)

263. This is not intended to be a list of exclusive remedies but instead to describe the primary
remedy associated with each dimension of the duty to serve.
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We believe these obligations serve as compelling bases to inform the scope
and presence of a duty to adapt, extending the traditional duty to serve to
obligate public utilities to make operational and planning decisions in a manner
that accounts for changing conditions in light of climate change.
III. FUNCTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE DUTY TO ADAPT AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS
As a normative matter, judicial recognition of a private duty to adapt for
energy utilities advances the functions of both tort law and economic regulation.
We view these functions primarily as a form of gap filling, given extant utility
regulation’s failure to fully recognize the foreseeable risks and harms associated
with climate change and energy resilience in operations and planning.
Ultimately, there may be more interplay between the two than static review
suggests, and the duty to adapt may over time drive regulatory regimes to better
account for climate change and improve energy resilience. As is also discussed
in this part, these functions can provide courts some guideposts as they consider
various defenses to claims based on the duty to adapt, such as the act of God
and filed rate defenses.
A.

The Duty To Adapt’s Benefits for Tort and Regulatory Law

Perhaps the most widely accepted rationale for tort liability is that
providing victims compensation for harms caused by a defendant holds the
defendant accountable for foreseeable harm.264 Imposing liability on a
defendant can simultaneously provide for victim compensation and effectuate
deterrence, incentivizing the defendant and others in the same industry to
invest in safety precautions to reduce the risks of future harms.265 There is
considerable evidence that energy utilities do not robustly disclose climate risks
to investors in capital markets.266 Imposing a private obligation on a defendant
that operates energy infrastructure facilities which present a risk of harm helps
to internalize the costs of its operations; this incentivizes firms to invest in
precautions that will reduce the likelihood and degree of future harm, thus
serving a deterrence function for the energy industry. Recognition of a private
tort duty to adapt should help to improve the accuracy of the risks that energy
regulators disclose to capital markets and to drive utilities to assess adaptation
264. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1051–53 (N.Y. 1916).
265. Compensation and deterrence are widely recognized as the two primary functions of private
tort liability. See Douglas Kysar, The Public Life of Private Law: Tort Law as a Risk Regulation Mechanism,
9 EUR. J. RISK REGUL. 48, 49 (2018).
266. A review of corporate 10-K reports that seven Texas utilities filed with the SEC showed little
or no discussion of material physical risks associated with foreseeable weather events associated with
climate change. See JONES ET AL., supra note 123, at ii.
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risks in their internal decision-making processes more proactively and regularly,
improve the ways in which they notify customers of expected outages, and
expand investments to reduce liability stemming from service interruption
and/or failure to meet technical service standards. A private law duty to adapt
can thus encourage the industry to address climate adaptation risks that current
regulatory institutions fail to properly value.
As a practical matter, a private duty to adapt does not require courts to
mandate that a utility provide a particular level or kind of adequate service or
to meet a specific set of technical standards. As an ongoing obligation, we see
the main advantage of the duty to adapt as encouraging an energy grid operator
to engage in certain processes to evaluate its approach to adaptation risks, rather
than requiring it to invest in specific assets or technologies. To discharge the
duty to adapt, a utility may be expected to more regularly update its risk
assessments to reflect the harms associated with climate change and/or conduct
climate resilience planning. Because the duty to adapt requires public utilities
to make operational and planning decisions in a manner that accounts for
changing conditions in light of climate change, the duty should at minimum
obligate firms to consider the benefits and feasibility of doing so through
conducting climate vulnerability studies. Such an obligation could serve a
similar function to tort cases that find liability where a manufacturer failed to
consider safer options in designing a product, without requiring a manufacturer
to adopt a specific product design. Also, much like the obligation of a
manufacturer of a product to warn of risks it becomes aware of after a product
has been sold, the duty to adapt is an ongoing and evolving obligation.267 This
formulation of the duty to adapt as an ongoing obligation allows it to remain
applicable over time as new technologies and feasible best practices are
identified.
A duty to adapt also advances tort principles pertaining to insurance and
cost spreading. The utility is able to spread the costs of harm among a broad
pool of customers, and once the duty to adapt imposes an obligation, regulators
may allow a utility to recover prudently incurred costs in rates.268 At the same
time, a tort perspective highlights that it is also important to think about the
limits of relying too heavily on a duty to adapt for insurance against harms. If
267. According to the Restatement (Third) of Torts, a manufacturer’s duty to warn of a risk associated
with the intended use of a product is not discharged at the time of sale. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PRODUCTS LIAB. § 10 (AM. L. INST. 1998). A manufacturer also has a duty to warn end users
of the product who can be identified and communicated with of new risks after the sale of the product,
as long as the risk of injury or death from the hazard is greater than the burden of providing the notice
to the end user. Id.
268. See JOEL B. EISEN, EMILY HAMMOND, JIM ROSSI, DAVID B. SPENCE & HANNAH J.
WISEMAN, ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 479–572 (5th ed. 2020) (discussing
utility ratemaking principles, including cost allocation and the prudent investment standard).
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the utility is ultimately asked to serve as the insurer for all harms (as would be
the case with absolute liability), even those that are not foreseeable, this can
create moral hazard problems. For example, if customers do not take into
account the risks of harms, such as damage due to wildfires caused by a utility’s
transmission system, this may induce them to engage in behaviors (such as
building new homes in high-risk areas) that can increase, rather than decrease,
the risk of harm.269
Similar moral hazard concerns exist for utilities. Competitive firms have
every reason to account for potential liabilities, as adverse judgments are a cost,
ultimately paid by its shareholders. In contrast, a public utility can often shift
liability costs to its customers. Because utility revenues are driven by cost
recovery, newfound liability may perversely increase profits. At its extreme,
this concern would turn the duty to adapt on its head, giving the utility reason
to disregard climate impacts and welcome its liabilities. This outcome is
preventable, as utility regulators have the authority to deny cost recovery for
liabilities incurred by the utility, shifting costs to shareholders. California
regulators chose this course of action in response to SDG&E’s request to
include settlement costs incurred from wildfire damage in its rate base.270 We
do not mean to suggest, however, that regulators should reflexively deny cost
recovery. This is particularly true in cases where a regulator denies utility plans
to address climate impacts. Here, a utility may find itself in a double bind,
where regulation prevents it from recouping the costs to implement adaptation
measures but holds its shareholders accountable for the liabilities incurred under
the duty to adapt.
These concerns are not unique to the duty to adapt and are generally
relevant whenever a monopolistic firm with a captured rate base faces liability.
They also highlight one benefit conveyed by the duty to adapt’s negligence
standard, particularly in contrast to utility obligations premised in strict
liability. The latter limits the judicial inquiry, foreclosing jury assessments of
reasonableness. Strict liability may also result in the most extreme
manifestations of the concerns highlighted above, and utility efforts to
implement adaptation measures may be stymied if only one choice, be it cost
shifting or shareholder responsibility, becomes the norm.271 Although a

269. See, e.g., SADIE FRANK, ERICK GESICK & DAVID G. VICTOR, INVITING DANGER: HOW
FEDERAL DISASTER, INSURANCE AND INFRASTRUCTURE POLICIES ARE MAGNIFYING THE HARM
OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2021), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Inviting
_Danger_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WVA-GLFY].
270. See supra note 221.
271. Although legislative, California’s approach to future costs associated with utility-caused
wildfires provides one example where shareholders and ratepayers will equally share responsibility. AB
1054, which creates a $21 billion fund to support utility wildfire damage costs, will be jointly funded
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negligence standard does not extinguish these concerns, it does not impose the
same scope of liability and links liability to the reasonableness of an energy
operator’s decisions. By giving a jury discretion to determine the reasonableness
of decisions made by the utility, a duty to adapt provides a mechanism for
producing information and developing a record about adaptation measures,
especially where regulation has failed to require consideration of adaptation
risks.
In this sense, recognizing the duty to serve as a form of private obligation
in tort allows private law to help reinforce and improve utility regulation, which
can suffer from significant gaps in its remedies and lags in the decision-making
process about how to address adaptation harms. To the extent that the existing
regulatory apparatus already provides applicable standards for the duty to serve,
negligence per se can be used to supply the standard of wrongfulness, which
would reinforce existing regulatory standards. As in other negligence cases,
existing regulatory standards should set the floor for expected conduct, not
impose a ceiling on it.272 Thus, properly understood, the duty to adapt would
supplement existing regulation—not serve as a substitute for it.273 It can help to
improve regulatory enforcement and provide better information to regulators
as they set regulatory standards, approve infrastructure plans, and make
prudency determinations related to climate adaptation risks.
In its current form, public utility regulation does not do a particularly good
job of addressing or remedying climate adaptation risks associated with
operation of the energy grid. Regulatory oversight is necessarily constrained
and, although public utility statutes are often written broadly, the authority of
utility regulators is not boundless. Utility regulator mandates and utility tariffs
typically focus on ensuring, among other things, just and reasonable rates and
prudent investment, and on protecting customers from discriminatory
pricing—not addressing environmental risks and harms.274 Courts have a broad
set of remedies available, including awarding monetary damages, but regulatory
by shareholders and ratepayers, each contributing $10.5 billion. See Act of July 12, 2019, § 16, 2019 Cal.
Stat. 1888, 1910–19 (codified as amended at CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 3280–3297 (2022)).
272. In negligence cases, compliance with a state statute or regulation is not typically considered a
defense. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 16(a),
16 cmt. 10 (AM. L. INST. 2010). Of course, in limited instances compliance with federal statutes may
preempt common law claims. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 881–83 (2000). An
even broader form of preemption of federal common law claims was found in American Electric Power
Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 415 (2011) (dismissing public nuisance lawsuit on the grounds that the
Clean Air Act displaced federal common law claims).
273. Among tort law scholars, Robert Rabin has made similar arguments in his criticism of the
regulatory compliance defense. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Keynote Paper: Reassessing Regulatory
Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049 (2000).
274. For a discussion of this, see Jody Freeman, The Uncomfortable Convergence of Energy and
Environmental Law, 41 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 339, 359 (2017).
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commissions that prioritize consumer protection goals often operate with more
constrained remedial tools—they may, for example, be able to provide
customers refunds for overcharges but do not have authority on their own to
remedy backward-looking harms.275 In areas of the country with organized
markets, determinations around generation and resource adequacy are at the
very least less tightly controlled than in decades past.276 Tort claims based on
the duty to adapt can fill these jurisdictional gaps as a complement to, not a
substitute for, energy regulation’s setting of just and reasonable rates.
Perhaps more important than existing statutory confines are the
confluence of institutional, political, budgetary, and informational problems
that any regulatory agency must necessarily face. Utility commissioners
frequently leave before terms expire, with twenty-five percent of state
regulators turning over each year.277 The size of commission staffs vary
dramatically across states, as do agency budgets, with the average budget at $30
million. Texas, the second most populous state, only has a utility regulator
budget of $16 million.278 Resources for enforcement are often limited, and
imposition of regulatory penalties are often constrained by onerous procedural
requirements.279 Even where regulatory commission authority is broad on
paper, elements such as experience, staffing, and budget all cabin the extent to
which it is actually used in practice. Stakeholder engagement can also weigh
heavily upon commissions’ direction. Some states, either through designations
or funding mechanisms, support robust intervention by consumer and public
interest organizations.280 But others do not, and limit participation to only those
entities that can afford to retain legal counsel, expert witnesses, and/or other
specialists.281

275. See WEBB ET AL., supra note 10, at 39–48 (assessing differences in availability and remedy
between courts and PUCs).
276. See Freeman, supra note 274, at 370–71.
277. See Hannah Polikov, Everything You Need To Know About Public Utility Commissions,
ADVANCED ENERGY ECON. (July 17, 2013, 11:36 AM), https://blog.aee.net/aee/bid/318037/every
thing-you-need-to-know-about-public-utility-commissions [https://perma.cc/M2CC-E6C7].
278. See Jessie Ciulla & Cory Felder, ERCOT Isn’t the Only Thing That Needs Fixing, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN INST. (Mar. 15, 2021), https://rmi.org/ercot-isnt-the-only-thing-that-needs-fixing/ [https
://perma.cc/C5YF-32SC].
279. See, e.g., Order in the Matter of the Petition of Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. for Approval of
the Energy Storage Program, In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., Nos. EO13020155 & GO13020156
(N.J. Bd. Pub. Utils. Sept. 30, 2013), https://www.nj.gov/bpu/pdf/announcements/2013/ES%20Mot
ion%20to%20Intervene.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7AQ-RSNS] (denying environmental organizations’
request to intervene).
280. See, e.g., Intervenor Compensation Program, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, https://www.cpuc.ca.
gov/proceedings-and-rulemaking/intervenor-compensation [https://perma.cc/Y7DU-TAGN].
281. For a discussion of state energy regulators, see generally REGUL. ASSISTANCE PROJECT,
ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE US: A GUIDE (2011), https://www.raponline.org/wp-
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Effective oversight of the industry can be particularly vulnerable to
circumstances where industry standards and customs evolve quickly. In its
present form, electricity regulation is ill-equipped to address climate adaptation
risks. Prudence (or “reasonableness”) review by regulators is most often
premised upon questions of whether the utility has overspent in the past; absent
some mechanism to encompass the costs associated with climate change, this
approach does not easily lend itself to the recognition of many of the risks
associated with climate change, such as the harms of extreme events.282 Over
time, regulator-mandated climate resilience planning should result in cost
savings for ratepayers, but comparing less historically defined benefits against
more easily quantifiable and near-term costs has proven difficult for regulators.
This concern is particularly salient for energy resilience considerations and
catastrophic and novel forms of risk, where high-impact, low-probability, longtail, and black-swan events may be difficult to assess using the deterministic
risk-based tools most familiar to utility regulators. Reliability metrics alone may
not be sufficient in addressing such resilience risks, and a duty to adapt may
grow in significance to the extent that climate change increases threats to energy
resilience. A duty to adapt may be especially significant in this context, as
regulation can be slow to update to cover novel risks, particularly in the absence
of precipitating events. Fundamentally, granting a monopoly to a utility
regulator can dampen incentives for innovation.283 And even where regulators
do recognize climate risk, cost-based regulation can significantly delay the
deployment of new investments and practices aimed at mitigating it. Only a
handful of states even require energy utilities to file climate resilience plans.284
The duty to adapt thus serves as a responsive pathway in the absence of a
regulatory response, giving redress to injury where regulation lags.
Optimistically, the duty to adapt might even promote more routine regulatory
updates to cover energy resilience in the same way that modern day conceptions
of electric reliability owe their origins to the duty to serve.

content/uploads/2016/05/rap-lazar-electricityregulationintheus-guide-2011-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/L
AU4-A8ZV].
282. See William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1614, 1691–92
(2014); see also Monast, supra note 20 (manuscript at 16–17); WEBB ET AL., supra note 10, at 18–20.
283. While some industries invest substantial amounts in R&D and new technological innovations,
the energy utility industry has been a laggard. See 6.2.1: The R&D Problem with Electric Utilities, PENN.
ST. COLL. EARTH MIN. SCIS., https://www.e-education.psu.edu/ebf483/node/682 [https://perma.cc/
5GX6-KQK6] (“Historically, less than one-half of one percent of revenues for electric utilities has gone
towards developing new technologies to improve the way that electricity is generated and
transmitted.”).
284. See Sara R. Gosman, Framing Energy Resilience, 35 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 1, 6 (2019) (noting
that only New York, Massachusetts, and California regulators have considered requiring energy
utilities to engage in climate resilience planning).
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Beyond considerations specific to energy resilience, rate regulation more
generally is ill-equipped to deal with the concerns that the duty to adapt
addresses. Rate regulation focuses on management of legacy infrastructure
without giving serious scrutiny to utility assessment of future adaptation
risks.285 Given the long-lived nature of utility assets (often fifty years or more),
the tangible business risks associated with cost-recovery of past investments are
prioritized over more remote forms of risks, which can present a significant
transition cost as a drag on moving away from traditional practices associated
with legacy assets.286 What economists call the “Averch-Johnson effect”
describes a tendency of utilities and regulators to favor inefficiently high levels
of capital outlays,287 even where there are less expensive options for addressing
climate risks, such as operational standards, better planning practices, or a focus
on energy storage, microgrids, or distributed energy resources.288
The duty to adapt may complement energy regulation’s planning horizon
as well. As noted earlier, prudence review is, by nature, backward-looking.289
Other aspects of utility planning, such as integrated resource plans, can fail to
account for changing conditions.290 Forward planning, to the extent it occurs, is
most often sized to time horizons that do not appropriately consider climate
risks or impacts.291 Where firms operate legacy transmission or generation
investments that were built decades ago, evidence of recent industry customs
(such as best practices, procedures, and available technologies) that regulators
may not have yet endorsed can help inform decisions related to useful asset life
and the feasibility of new investments.292 This kind of a feedback benefit from
tort law can produce important information that can help to better inform the
regulators that oversee the energy industry.293

285. See Direct Testimony of Tyler Fitch on Behalf of Vote Solar at 61–92, In re Duke Energy
Carolinas, LLC & Duke Energy Progress, LLC, Nos. 2019-224-E & 2019-225-E (S.C. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n Feb. 5, 2021) [hereinafter Fitch Testimony], https://dms.psc.sc.gov/Attachments/Matter
/371c2097-5be8-47af-963b-aa3b8e183fcb [https://perma.cc/5EKZ-C3UT] (noting a number of flaws in
utility integrated resource plans, including forecasting oversights and an artificially low carbon price).
286. See Hammond & Rossi, supra note 130, at 661.
287. See Averch & Johnson, supra note 138, at 1066–67.
288. See Fitch Testimony, supra note 285, at 55.
289. See Monast, supra note 20 (manuscript at 20).
290. Id. (manuscript at 28).
291. WEBB ET AL., supra note 10, at 8 (“While [integrated resource plans] vary, most employ a
twenty-year planning horizon, which is shorter than that recommended for climate resilience
planning.”).
292. See Hammond & Rossi, supra note 130, at 673.
293. We thus see the private duty to adapt as contributing to the role of regulation as an enabler
of better innovation and private standards. See generally Barbara A. Cosens, J.B. Ruhl, Niko Soininen
& Lance Gunderson, Designing Law To Enable Adaptive Governance of Modern Wicked Problems, 73
VAND. L. REV. 1697 (2000).
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Such benefits will be more pronounced in some jurisdictions than others.
In the context of the significant risks posed by climate change to the electricity
industry, regulators have begun to take notice of the information and
technologies that are available to industry, as is exemplified by the New York
state officials’ direction leading to Con. Ed.’s Climate Change Vulnerability
Study.294 But in New York, political economy variables have aligned to favor
reform: a state governor focused on climate and a well-staffed regulatory
agency, already engaged in a range of climate-related actions, took steps to
address climate risk in the energy sector.295 Perhaps even more significant, the
state had just experienced firsthand the devastation created by Hurricane
Sandy. It is not new for such “never again” moments to provide a salient focal
point to drive changes in environmental law; in the wake of human disasters
associated with an extreme weather event, political forces are more closely
attuned to the stark reality of what was previously only considered an abstract
and remote possibility.296
Certain state-specific legal doctrines, such as California’s application of
inverse condemnation, could also diminish the duty to adapt’s relevance.297
Inverse condemnation, which effectively holds the utility strictly liable for
wildfire damages traceable to its equipment, is an easier burden for a potential
plaintiff to meet than the duty to adapt’s negligence standard. However, as is
discussed above,298 in contrast to this strict liability approach, the duty to adapt’s
negligence standard provides important information and gap-filling benefits
while reducing moral hazards.
Wholesale replication of New York’s conditions or California’s inverse
condemnation doctrine to forty-nine other jurisdictions may thus be unrealistic
(and, for the latter, ill-advised) to the extent that this confluence of
circumstances drove the Con. Ed. Climate Change Vulnerability Study or
SDG&E wildfire mitigation plans. In this context, the duty to adapt might best
294. See WEBB ET AL., supra note 10, at 6–8.
295. See 2015 New York State Energy Plan, N.Y. ST., https://energyplan.ny.gov/ [https://
perma.cc/MFN7-NQZA]; see also Reforming the Energy Vision, N.Y. ST., https://www3.dps.ny.gov/W/
PSCWeb.nsf/All/CC4F2EFA3A23551585257DEA007DCFE2?OpenDocument [https://perma.cc/4Z
2M-HHKV].
296. Hence, many of our most significant environmental laws and regulation initiatives were borne
out of crisis. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 58–60 (2004); Molly
J. Walker Wilson & Megan P. Fuchs, Publicity, Pressure and Environmental Legislation: The Untold Story
of Availability Campaigns, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2147, 2180–214 (2009); Daniel A. Farber, Politics and
Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 66–67 (1992); ALICE C. HILL & LEONARDO
MARTINEZ-DIAZ, BUILDING A RESILIENCE TOMORROW: HOW TO PREPARE FOR THE COMING
CLIMATE DISRUPTION 20 (2019); see also Gregg P. Macey, Environmental Crisis and the Paradox of
Organizing, 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV. 2063, 2064.
297. See Gradwohl, supra note 212, at 596.
298. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
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be understood as another pathway where regulatory or statutory pathways are
not viable alternatives. And for all jurisdictions, a duty to adapt can supplement
the efforts of regulators even where a specific obligation related to adaptation
risks has already been codified into law.299 As a matter of tort law, such
codification represents the floor for liability but does not, and cannot, displace
the flexible supplemental tool that a private duty to serve provides injured
parties.300 Much like common law obligations overlap with applicable laws and
regulations in other contexts, the duty to adapt will overlap with any other
statute or regulation aimed at adaptation or mitigation. A fully realized carbon
tax or other mitigation policy designed to completely address climate change
would, for example, theoretically extinguish the need for the duty to adapt.301
So too would a routine adaptation planning process before regulators that fully
considers the costs and benefits of various adaptation measures, such as burying
transmission lines to address wildfire or hurricane risks. This approach allows
the common law to help reduce the lag of regulation in responding to new risks
and technologies and fill enforcement gaps not well addressed by traditional
regulatory or statutory oversight.302
B.

Some Functional Guideposts for Defenses

If not approached with care, defenses such as the act of God defense or the
filed rate doctrine can defeat a negligence claim based on the duty to adapt,
even where the recognition of the duty itself is without controversy. For
example, some cases involving harms to customers attributed to weather events
have been dismissed because of an act of God defense. Similarly, courts often
weigh interplay between tort claims and regulation and can dismiss claims on
the ground that an approved regulatory tariff limits recovery, known as the
“filed rate” defense. A functional approach to the duty to adapt provides some
guideposts for applying these defenses.

299. For example, existing integrated resource planning requirements routinely fail to assess
adaptation risks. See Fitch Testimony, supra note 285, at 36–37 (noting flaws in utility climate analysis,
including forecasting oversights and an artificially low carbon price).
300. Messer v. S. Airways Sales Co., 17 So. 2d 679, 682 (Ala. 1944).
301. However, a mitigation policy of this nature would require some lever to address adaptation
concerns as well, insofar as the consequences of climate change already exist. Additionally, because of
the nature of GHG emissions, immediate cessation would not result in the immediate end of climate
impacts.
302. See, e.g., WEBB ET AL., supra note 10, passim; see also Fitch Testimony, supra note 285, at 92–
100 (emphasizing ways for regulators to improve integrated resource planning to address adaptation
risks, including more up-to-date forecasting approaches and more accurate carbon pricing).
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1. The Act of God Defense and Extreme Weather Events
Defenses premised on emergency conditions or an act of God beyond the
utility’s control may potentially apply to duty-to-adapt claims.303 Utilities are
generally shielded from liability for temporary interruption or outages in
emergencies, or due to forces beyond their control. Often referred to as “act of
God” (in some jurisdictions “vis major”304 or “force of nature”305), this defense
echoes the force majeure defense, which excuses parties from contractual
obligations in the face of unusually severe, unexpected weather.306 As to
emergency conditions, a utility may only interrupt energy service when
necessary, with adequate notice (when possible), and not done in an arbitrary
manner.307 In an early suit in Florida, a court found no liability for a disruption
of service that directly resulted from a hurricane because the act of God defense
provided a legal justification for nondelivery.308 In other circumstances, courts
might deny liability where the utility’s equipment malfunctions due to weather
if the utility’s tariff explicitly exculpates the utility from liability for disruptions
caused by severe weather.309
Courts sometimes use such defenses as a shorthand way of concluding that
no duty exists in the first place, raising an important question of when extreme
303. See, e.g., Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. W. Pub. Serv. Co., 142 F.2d 857, 859 (10th Cir.
1944).
304. See Goldberg v. R. Grier Miller & Sons, Inc., 182 A.2d 759, 761–63 (Pa. 1962) (emphasizing
the need to instruct juries on vis major instead of act of God because the act of God defense is confusing
and might encourage excusing wrongdoing due to divine intervention, while a secular verdict requires
“down-to-earth, tangible, mathematical analysis”).
305. In the original Restatement of Torts and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, “force of nature” is
used in lieu of “act of God.” For the original Restatement, see RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS
§§ 195 cmt. e, 290 cmt. h, 302, 324 cmt. b, 338 cmt. b, 349 cmt. b, 365 cmt. a, 368 cmt. e, 377 cmt. c,
450, 451, 470 cmt. a, 510, 522, 817 cmt. l, 848 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1934) (giving the definition of
harm). For the Second Restatement, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 7 cmt. c, 25 cmt. a,
195 cmt. e, 199 cmt. b, 290 cmt. i, 302, 314A cmt. d, 324 cmt. b, 338 cmt. b, 349 cmt. b, 365 cmt. a,
368 cmt. j, 377 cmt. c, 433A cmt. a, 442A cmt. a, 442B cmt. b, 443 cmt. a, 450, 451, 504, 510, 522, 817
cmt. m (AM. L. INST. 1965). But see id. § 328A cmt. b. The Restatement (Third) of Torts actually defines
an “act of God” as “a serious and unusual adverse natural event.” See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 cmt. 1 (AM. L. INST. 2015).
306. For discussion, see Jocelyn L. Knoll & Shannon L. Bjorklund, Force Majeure and Climate
Change: What Is the New Normal?, 8 J. AM. COLL. CONSTR. LAWS., February 2014, at 1, 1, https://
www.dorsey.com/-/media/file/uploads/images/force_majeure_and_climate_change_030420.pdf?la=en
[https://perma.cc/NL9Z-5DGT].
307. Nat’l Food Stores, Inc. v. Union Elec. Co., 494 S.W.2d 379, 383–84 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
308. Fla. Power Corp. v. City of Tallahassee, 18 So. 2d 671, 675 (Fla. 1944).
309. See Sheffler v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 955 N.E.2d 1110, 1121 (Ill. 2011) (refusing a
customer class action for service interruption where the tariff limited recovery to malfunctions “not
caused by weather”). But see Nat’l Union Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Puget Sound Power & Light, 972
P.2d 481, 482 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (refusing to allow an act of God defense to a windstorm-related
service interruption claim based on a tariff that limits damages that “result from” circumstances beyond
the utility’s control).
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climate events or duty-to-adapt claims should trigger such defenses. It has been
questioned whether, as a practical matter, such defenses continue to apply to
environmental claims under federal statutes.310 It seems specious too that any
human-induced climate event would trigger the act of God defense where the
injury is avoidable, and if so, a duty to adapt triggered by anthropogenic climate
change should not raise the possibility of this defense at all.311
To the extent that an act of God defense applies at all to duty-to-adapt
tort claims, courts should exercise extreme caution in allowing defendants to
invoke it—especially where there is general judicial notice of foreseeability of
harms to groups of victims. To begin, as a matter of causation it is not necessary
for a plaintiff to prove that a natural event is the sole cause of the harm, as long
as the defendant’s negligence contributed in some meaningful measure to the
resulting harm.312 In this sense, the act of God defense simply restates the
modern doctrine of actual cause, that establishing negligence does not require
the identification of a single cause of harm and allows for the attribution of
responsibility to intervening causes. Where there is a preventable human cause
of the harm within the control of the defendant (or where the defendant
exercising reasonable care would make the harm avoidable), it is inappropriate
to apply the act of God defense.313 Some courts have foreclosed an act of God
defense for extreme weather that leads to unreasonable interruptions in utility
service, instead considering it as a form of concurrent cause. In Arkansas Valley
Electric Co-Operative Corp. v. Davis,314 the plaintiff was injured after coming into
contact with a fallen electric power line after a storm.315 Defendant utility
argued that the injury was due to an act of God, but the court concluded that a
jury could reasonably find that the utility had failed to replace a pole “which
they knew to be deteriorated.”316 It held, in turn, that “[i]f an act of God concurs
with the negligence or fault of man to proximately cause damages, the
negligence or fault is not excused by the act of God.”317
In other jurisdictions, the act of God defense is so narrow that it simply
doesn’t apply unless the weather event is wholly unforeseeable. According to an
310. Clifford J. Villa, Is the “Act of God” Dead?, 7 WASH. J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y 320, 323 (2017)
(observing that not one single reported environmental liability case under federal statutes allowed an
act of God defense to prevail).
311. For an argument that the act of God defense does not, see generally Kenneth T. Kristl,
Diminishing the Divine: Climate Change and the Act of God Defense, 15 WIDENER L. REV. 325 (2010).
312. See Denis Binder, Act of God? or Act of Man?: A Reappraisal of the Act of God Defense in Tort
Law, 15 REV. LITIG. 1, 27 (1996).
313. Id.
314. 800 S.W.2d 420 (Ark. 1990).
315. Id. at 421.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 423.
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early California Supreme Court opinion, for an act of God defense to succeed,
“[T]he earth must be convulsed, the lightning must kindle the fire, the air must
blow in tempests or tornadoes, and the water must come in waterspouts or
sudden interruptions of the sea . . . by the forces of nature, uncontrolled and
unaided by the hand of man . . . .”318 Further, these natural forces must be
“entirely independent of human agency” and of a character that is “inevitable”
and “irresistible.”319 As the California Supreme Court observed in rejecting an
act of God defense based on irregularly heavy rainfall, “[t]here is nothing in the
nature of the rainstorm involved in this case which makes it so totally
unforeseeable as to act as a superseding cause.”320
At the very least, the duty to adapt should serve as a reminder to courts
that emergencies are not an automatic shield from liability where the risks and
harm created by infrastructure in light of extreme weather are avoidable (rather
than inevitable), especially where there is evidence that they resulted from the
utility’s own negligence. The success of an act of God defense may ultimately
depend on the degree to which there are other foreseeable causal events within
the control of the defendant. But a well-established caveat to the act of God
defense is that the act or occurrence beyond the utility’s control must be so
extraordinary and unanticipated that it could not have been foreseen or
prevented by the utility’s exercise of reasonable care.321 Utilities may not be
liable where weather or other outside forces cause unintended outages that harm
unforeseeable victims, but beyond this, the act of God defense is only applicable
where a risk is not within the utility’s control and the weather event is not
foreseeable at all.
Though some states limit the applicability of the act of God defense to
instances where the damage caused by the severe weather is physically
unpreventable,322 one implication of the cases that base an act of God defense
on foreseeability is that a court could potentially accept the defense for a broader
range of cases. However, where an extreme weather event is recurring over a
utility’s planning cycle (often five to ten years, and sometimes longer), or where
the utility has not itself made planning or risk assessment efforts that go beyond
what regulators require, courts should be wary about applying an act of God
318. Polack v. Pioche, 35 Cal. 416, 417 (1868).
319. Id. at 417–18.
320. S. Pac. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 55 P.2d 847, 849 (Cal. 1936) (noting that “[r]ainfall is
foreseeable in most places” and for this reason, there “is no point at which an expectable heavy rain
becomes an act of God by reason of its unusual volume”).
321. The act of God defense “applies only to events in nature so extraordinary that the history of
climactic variations and other conditions in the particular locality afford no reasonable warning of
them.” McFarland v. Entergy Miss., Inc., 919 So. 2d 894, 903 (Miss. 2005) (citing federal cases from
the 11th Circuit and Alabama precedents).
322. Nat’l Food Stores, Inc. v. Union Elec. Co., 494 S.W.2d 379, 381–82 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
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defense to duty-to-adapt claims. Climate science continues to advance rapidly,
and actors in the United States are increasingly better equipped to predict, with
refined geographic and temporal specificity, impacts of climate change.323 With
climate impact tools available today tailored to areas as specific in spatial
dimension as a single square mile, and data updated on a daily, hourly, and
minutely basis, current science is now able to reveal the physical risks of climate
change to electrical infrastructure and operation with incredible specificity and
make foresight feasible.324 Indeed, work subsequently developed by Con. Ed.
and SDG&E serve as proof positive that such information is knowable,
foreseeable, and actionable in the United States.325
A limited approach to the act of God defense in extreme weather cases is
consistent with the case law. In National Food Stores, the utility was unable to
meet increased demand for power in response to a record heat wave.326 While
the plaintiff’s suit alleged negligence for failing to properly notify customers of
planned shutoffs during the emergency, the court recognized that a part of the
duty includes planning for foreseeable or contemplated changes in consumer
demand and that it was not necessary for the utility to have knowledge of a
specific customer’s susceptibility to damage.327 Likewise, a New York court
upheld a lower court determination that a utility was liable for a failure to
provide adequate power to a movie theater because it could have anticipated the
outage.328 The utility generated power from a dam, but when a mill upstream
prevented water flow it was unable to operate the plant adequately.329 The court
concluded it was reasonable for a jury to have concluded the utility could “have
anticipated or expected such a situation to arise” and “should have made
provision therefor.”330 Thus, in addressing the appropriateness of an act of God
defense, courts routinely encompass an obligation to properly plan to ensure

323. Note as well that climate science likewise continues to advance in specificity with respect to
the relationship between patterns of increasing emissions and climate change. The study of climate
change attribution is generally outside the scope of this Article, as that level of granular prediction is
not necessary to support the duty to adapt. For further discussion, see generally Sophie Marjanac &
Lindene Patton, Extreme Weather Event Attribution Science and Climate Change Litigation: An Essential
Step in the Causal Chain?, 36 J. ENERGY & NAT. RES. L. 265 (2018) (noting how the science of event
attribution may increasingly become a driver of climate litigation, to the extent that it shifts the
understanding of what weather is expected and foreseeable).
324. See U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RSCH. PROGRAM, 1 CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT 1 (D.J.
Wuebbles, D.W. Fahey, K.A. Hibbard, D.J. Dokken, B.C. Stewart & T.K. Maycock eds., 2017),
https://science2017.globalchange.gov/ [https://perma.cc/K5HY-VZLM].
325. For discussion, see supra Section II.B.3.
326. Nat’l Food Stores, 494 S.W.2d at 384.
327. Id.
328. Curry v. Norwood Elec. Light & Power Co., 211 N.Y.S. 441, 443–44 (Cnty. Ct. 1925).
329. Id. at 443.
330. Id. at 443–44.
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adequate service based on the notion of a risk of harm to foreseeable victims
within the control of the utility.
Of course, in operation much may depend on how, exactly, courts set a
threshold for foreseeability. This may require fact-specific assessments of
predictive data in particular contexts. With respect to extreme events, courts
should be mindful that uncertainty is not what matters to the determination of
a duty to adapt. By definition, extreme weather events are classic lowprobability, high-impact occurrences, and there is always some uncertainty
about the behavior of the weather. Although a past similar event is some
evidence of foreseeability, the assessment of foreseeability also should not fixate
on whether there has been a past event as a touchstone for whether a future
event is foreseeable. Rather, courts should consider the full range of predictive
evidence that would be available to the industry, including data and forecasting
techniques that can identify not only changes in average weather but also
variance in weather patterns.331 In the context of utility planning, this evidence
is widely available to utilities and regulators, and is routinely used to model
system peaks and plan for capital expenditures. Indeed, insurance companies
and financial markets routinely offer to the industry risk-management products
that assess weather evidence on a granular basis.332 It thus would be appropriate
to apply a general presumption that a defendant who is an energy grid operator
has access to predictive forecasting knowledge. Given the difficulties of
decoupling such evidence from evidence of a defendant’s conduct in considering
predictive weather risks in its operations and planning, courts should err on the
side of allowing a jury to consider the reasonableness of the defendant utility’s
behaviors before applying an act of God defense. In practice, this means that
this defense should have only a very narrow application to extreme weather
cases where some predictive evidence of weather patterns would have been
available to utilities before an event. If it applies to duty-to-adapt claims at all,
it should be limited in its application to situations where a first-time weather
event is not knowable—though to the extent the risk of harm to a victim is
wholly unforeseeable there would be no duty to adapt in the first place.

331. For a similar argument in the context of force majeure and climate change, see Knoll &
Bjorklund, supra note 306, at 21–22.
332. Like other companies, utilities can purchase weather hedges, a derivative investment that
allows companies to manage the risk of financial consequences of unusually severe weather. See Joanne
Morrison, Managing Weather Risk: Will Derivatives Use Rise?, FUTURES INDUS., Jan.–Feb. 2009, at 26,
27; see also Gabe Grosberg, Can U.S. Utilities Weather the Storm, S&P GLOB (Nov. 8, 2018), https://
www.spglobal.com/en/research-insights/articles/can-u-s-utilities-weather-the-storm [https://perma.cc
/4F4M-4THH] (noting that utilities increasingly are using innovative financial products to address
extreme weather risks, “including catastrophic bonds and weather derivative bonds”).
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2. Tariff-Based Defenses
While strongly rooted in contractual obligations, as has been discussed
throughout this Article, the duty to adapt can independently support private
claims in tort. An appreciation of its functions can shed light on the scope of
defenses based on regulation.
A tariff between a utility and a customer can create tort obligations
(grounded in contractual privity), and a private duty to adapt can help to
reinforce the reliance and expectation interests of such commercial
arrangements. But like other contracts, a utility’s tariff with a customer can also
attempt to modify or limit tort obligations. To the extent regulators accept or
approve such tariffs, utilities may be emboldened even more to rely on utility
tariffs as a shield to duty-to-adapt claims. Our discussion of the functions of the
duty to adapt suggests some guideposts for courts in considering these defenses.
a. When To Favor Tort over Contract
To begin, it is important to assess which tort obligations (if any) are
actually modified by the contractual terms that customers may have with a
utility. The terms typically are spelled out in a utility’s tariff with a customer,
which it routinely files with (and which is sometimes approved by) a state
regulator.333 In negligence claims where consumers are injured by business
service providers, many courts look with skepticism at exculpatory clauses or
express assumption of risk defenses.334 Likewise, some courts have refused to
enforce tariff provisions that have the same effects as exculpatory clauses, on
the rationale that public policy favors allowing private tort enforcement to
promote safety over allowing customers to contract around risks.335 To the
extent courts evaluate whether tariff provisions limiting liability are valid as a
matter of public policy, the functional benefits that the duty to adapt brings to
both tort and regulatory law should be considered.
Though we believe that the benefits of the duty to adapt will typically
weigh against full waiver of private tort claims, special tariff provisions between
a customer and utility may still be warranted in some limited circumstances. In
333. See generally EISEN ET AL., supra note 268, at 81–90.
334. Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d. 441, 443–44 (Cal. 1963) (outlining several
factors for courts to consider in evaluating whether an exculpatory agreement with a consumer is
affected with the public interest and thus invalid, and refusing to enforce an exculpatory clause signed
by a patient entering a defendant’s hospital for surgery); Dalury v. S-K-I, Ltd., 670 A.2d 795, 799–800
(Vt. 1995) (applying the Tunkl factors to hold that a consumer exculpatory form agreement that released
the defendant ski resort operator from all liability for negligence was invalid).
335. S.W. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Artesia Alfalfa Growers’ Ass’n, 353 P.2d 62, 71–72 (N.M. 1960)
(finding a contract that relieved an electric company of all liability for temporary interruptions violated
public policy on the ground that a duty to furnish adequate, efficient, and reasonable service was owed
and so negligently caused harm cannot be excused).
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some contexts, tariffs can provide a useful contractual mechanism to address
some risks and harms more effectively than a private duty to adapt. Tariffs are
especially likely to be a useful risk-shifting device where the customer is
sophisticated and has access to insurance, and when there are moral hazard
issues related to a customer knowingly taking on unique risks that are not shared
by all customers. For example, a tariff might be used to clarify that a business
customer is assuming certain risks associated with interruptible service, as
where a business customer has its own backup service provisions (such as local
storage) or has insured against an inventory or business loss associated with
power outages. A residential customer who knowingly chooses to build a home
in a location that is particularly vulnerable to risks such as wildfires or
hurricanes presents a more difficult case. While a tariff may serve as evidence
that a specific customer has agreed to insure against harms on its own336 (which
may address some moral hazard problems by placing the risk with the party who
might most cheaply mitigate it), whether shifting the risks to a customer is more
desirable than holding a utility accountable for harm under a private duty to
adapt will depend on customer housing mobility and widespread availability of
private insurance that can cover harms.337
Contracts can also be used to clarify and shift risks between power
suppliers and utilities. Such approaches seem appropriate, insofar as these are
sophisticated parties who presumably understand risks and would be well
positioned to insure for economic losses in their business operations. Power sale
contracts that indemnify power suppliers from downstream climate-adaptation
risks presumably would reflect a lower purchase price than contracts that do
indemnify the seller, as the utility (not the supplier) would be expected to bear
the costs of harm. In order for power sale (and insurance) markets to effectively
price such risk-shifting, however, risk-shifting devices must still hold some
party accountable for climate adaptation risks. If a utility has a tariff limiting
its liability to customers and also includes liability limits in its purchase
agreements with power suppliers for harms to persons or property associated
with climate adaptation, risk-shifting between utilities and suppliers can extend
a utility’s liability shield to an upstream actor who is not subject to the same
regulatory oversight. Power supply markets—such as the operation of power
generators or natural gas suppliers who could not provide energy during the
336. The more specific, and in particular the more customer-specific, such tariff terms are, the
more likely they are to be enforced, as this would be evidence that the terms were actually bargained
for rather than imposed on the customer.
337. In California, it is not clear that the risks of wildfires are best born by homeowners, to the
extent that private homeowner insurance markets are increasingly failing to insure these risks. See
Sophie Quinton, As Wildfire Risk Increases, Home Insurance Is Harder To Find, PEW CHARITABLE TRS.
(Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2019/01/03/aswildfire-risk-increases-home-insurance-is-harder-to-find [https://perma.cc/7WC7-54PB].
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winter 2021 Texas outages—should not go without regulatory or judicial
scrutiny altogether, and courts may need to police whether risk-shifting is being
used as a strategic device to contract around the deterrence and compensation
benefits afforded by a duty to adapt.
For this same reason, the duty to adapt should not be read to suggest that
tort claims against other actors in the energy sector are unviable. Other energy
firms, such as suppliers and generators, may be held liable under more general
conceptions of responsibility under a general common law duty of care. Indeed,
in certain circumstances, holding such entities liable rather than a public utility
may have comparative advantages. The modern energy sector is typified by
competitive markets and, unlike in decades past, the public utility in
restructured markets is often not the owner of generation or certain retail
services.338 For this reason, the utility may not necessarily be best positioned to
control risks and to ensure system reliability in all instances. Rather, generation
owners, retail power providers, or upstream suppliers may have unique abilities
to control for certain risks of outages. In the winter 2021 Texas event, for
instance, public utilities may have had limited ability to influence natural gas
supplier decisions against weatherizing equipment or retail power provider
billing practices. Holding the “cheapest cost avoider” accountable is not always
limited to a utility, and extending liability to suppliers, generators, and other
service providers as well could help to incent the type of risk reduction the duty
to adapt addresses. For this reason, and particularly in restructured states, we
would expect such claims to emerge and to borrow heavily from the duty to
adapt, even if the defendants are not fully regulated as public utilities.
Liability limits in customer tariffs often do not fully excuse the defendant
utility, but instead limit liability to specific forms of wrongdoing. In many
jurisdictions, courts have allowed utility tariffs that limit private claims against
utilities to gross negligence.339 In these jurisdictions, a customer’s gross
negligence claim against a utility may still proceed against a utility where there
is evidence of extreme indifference to or reckless disregard of the safety of
others.340 For example, it would seem that cases involving repeat similar weather
events in a rough utility planning cycle of a decade—such as the 2021 freeze in
338. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260, 267 (2016) (“Since the FPA’s passage,
electricity has increasingly become a competitive interstate business, and FERC’s role has evolved
accordingly.”).
339. See, e.g., Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211, 223 (Tex. 2002) (upholding utility
tariff provisions limiting the recovery of economic damages and limiting the recovery of damages for
personal injury to gross negligence or willful misconduct).
340. A careless mistake or unreasonable inadvertence can suffice for negligence. However, gross
negligence requires some evidence of conscious or willful disregard of the need to exercise reasonable
care. The Restatement (Second) of Torts and many jurisdictions do not distinguish between gross
negligence and recklessness.
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Texas (which followed a 2011 winter outage) or the 2017 and 2018 California
wildfires—can easily raise factual questions of gross negligence, based on utility
indifference to risks in operating the energy grid in light of similar events that
caused similar harms in the past.341
As is discussed above, some utility tariffs also limit liability for harms to
customers that “result from” equipment malfunction due to weather.342 Such
terms may have been accepted as a limit on liability when there were few
technological options for addressing extreme weather events—serving a
function akin to an act of God defense—but to the extent weather events are
knowable and that utilities are expected to take this into account in their
planning and operations, courts should consider whether these kinds of tariff
limitations continue to be valid as a matter of public policy. Even if these kinds
of terms are enforceable, reading them literally to deny customer liability for a
weather-induced interruption based on such language would require some
factual assessment of causation,343 and thus the mere existence of such language
should not be understood as a blanket defense to a duty-to-adapt claim.
Important too is the question of whether a tariff limits or waives liability
for a noncustomer victim who is not a party to the contract. As a general rule
of contract law, a party cannot waive or modify the rights or obligations of a
nonparty.344 So a utility tariff that purports to limit liability to noncustomers is
not legally binding based on contract principles, since the nonparty has not
assented to these terms. Thus, a utility’s obligations toward a noncustomer who
is injured by a utility’s failure to take precautions required by a duty to adapt—
such as the owner of a home destroyed in a wildfire that can be traced to the
utility’s unreasonable conduct—should be determined based on the
compensation and deterrence benefits associated with the duty to adapt, rather

341. The Texas suit filed against ERCOT and Entergy alleges gross negligence in the death of an
eleven-year-old boy, on the basis of the utilities having previous knowledge of system vulnerabilities
to extreme winter weather. See Madani, supra note 168. Some of the misconduct associated with the
2019 California wildfires rose to the level of criminal charges, which certainly would be sufficient to
support a gross negligence claim. See Ivan Penn, PG&E Charged with Crimes in 2019 California Wildfire,
N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/06/business/energy-environment/pge-kincade-fire
.html [https://perma.cc/U98V-9MZ6 (staff-uploaded, dark archive)] (Apr. 30, 2021).
342. See Sheffler v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 955 N.E.2d 1110, 1121 (Ill. 2011) (imposing a limit
on liability under similar tariff language).
343. For example, is an interruption due to equipment malfunction, or is it due to operational error
or a failure to plan? And does such a provision excuse a utility from a failure to have a backup system
in place where a foreseeable equipment malfunction occurs?
344. Of course, this is more of a principle than a rule; as a practical matter some contracts (like
wills and arbitration agreements) do have some binding effect on third parties. For a discussion of some
of the difficulties in applying this general rule to commercial agreements, see generally Mark P.
Gergen, Privity’s Shadow: Exculpatory Terms in Extended Forms of Private Ordering, 43 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1 (2015).
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than the strict contractual terms of a tariff.345 Commercial agreements between
energy suppliers and utilities that shift risks should be evaluated similarly, with
a focus on the foreseeability of risks to both contracting parties, whether one
party is in a unique position to control the risks of harm, and the policy benefits
associated with tort liability.
b. Limiting the Scope of the Filed Rate Defense
Under what is known as the “filed rate” defense, a utility cannot be sued
for conduct contemplated by a tariff that has been filed with (and approved by)
a regulator.346 The original purpose of the filed rate defense was to protect
customers from discriminatory pricing behaviors, as where a utility might
secretly offer discounts to certain customers without making the same
opportunity available to other similarly situated customers.347 Some courts have
applied the defense more broadly, as a shorthand shield from common law tort

345. In commercial scenarios, often involving purely economic loss (e.g., tort duties limited by
contractual privity), Mark Gergen argues that the impact of privity on third parties should not be
determined entirely based on contractual assets but needs to be assessed based on “how vulnerable
people in the victim’s position would be to the risk of such harm without negligence liability” and “the
cost and risk of error in using negligence liability as a mechanism for compensation and deterrence.”
Id. at 7. For harms to a noncustomer outside of sophisticated commercial parties, this would typically
favor determining obligations based on the tort duty to adapt, rather than as limited by a contract to
which the customer has not assented—especially where the harms are physical or property harms
(rather than economic loss).
346. Jim Rossi, Lowering the Filed Tariff Shield: Judicial Enforcement for a Deregulatory Era, 56 VAND.
L. REV. 1591, 1598 (2003) [hereinafter Rossi, Lowering the Filed Tariff Shield].
347. For discussion, see Joshua C. Macey, Zombie Energy Laws, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1103 (2020)
(“[T]he filed rate doctrine was originally designed to protect consumer interests in the era of rateregulated utilities . . . [by] prevent[ing] utilities’ customers and regulators from invoking legal rules to
force utilities to deviate from the rates they filed with regulators.”) and Rossi, Lowering the Filed Tariff
Shield, supra note 346, at 1598–605.
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claims that works as a form of regulated-industries immunity within a state348
or, at times, as a form of federal preemption of state claims.349
While this defense is routinely invoked by regulated utilities, whether it
applies is a complicated question. The first question a court needs to consider
in approaching a filed rate defense is the basic issue of what obligations the tariff
purports to modify. As with a tariff’s contractual terms, as a general principle,
it is controversial for a filed rate defense to modify or limit a utility’s obligations
to a noncustomer. In order to limit recovery to a noncustomer, a utility must
invoke an independent, noncontractual legal source, such as express legislative
immunity for utility conduct.350 In addition, many of the cases that allow a filed
rate defense to negligence claims acknowledge that tariff language would still
allow gross negligence claims to proceed,351 raising the possibility that utilities
in some jurisdictions may be able to waive certain negligence claims but not
claims for gross negligence.
Where complex regulatory issues are implicated in common law claims,
courts have sometimes taken a blanket-immunity approach to the filed rate
348. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. S. Conn. Gas Co., 442 F. Supp. 3d 510, 517–18 (D. Conn. 2020)
(applying the filed rate doctrine to preclude a property insurance company from recovering in
negligence as a subrogee for harms due to a utility’s negligent interruption of service, though noting
too that the tariff allowed for recovery for willful misconduct or gross negligence); Oncor Elec.
Delivery Co. v. Chaparral Energy, LLC, 546 S.W.3d 133, 138 (Tex. 2018) (applying the filed rate
doctrine to a contract service interruption claim because of a “pervasive regulatory scheme” giving the
utility regulator “exclusive [] jurisdiction over the rates, operations and services of an electric utility”);
Brown v. United Water Del., Inc., 3 A.3d 272, 274 (Del. 2010) (applying the filed rate doctrine to
prohibit negligence claims, based on tariff language that exempted a utility for “all claims for injury to
persons or property by reason of fire, water, failure to supply water pressure, or capacity”—but allowing
gross negligence claims to proceed); Hoffman v. N. States Power Co., 764 N.W.2d 34, 47 (Minn.
2009) (applying the filed rate doctrine to preclude a claim for contract compensation based on
inadequate maintenance, noting “[t]he judiciary is not competent to engage in rate analysis, nor,
consistent with separation of powers principles, should the courts encroach on this legislative
function”).
349. See, e.g., California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 853 (9th Cir. 2004)
(dismissing tort actions due to their preemption under the filed rate doctrine); Tex. Com. Energy v.
TXU Energy, Inc., 413 F.3d 503, 508–09 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[C]ourts have consistently applied the filed
rate doctrine in a number of energy cases to preclude lawsuits against companies based on rates that
were filed with a government agency.” (citation omitted)); Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d
17, 18 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he doctrine holds that any ‘filed rate’—that is, one approved by the governing
regulatory agency—is per se reasonable and unassailable in judicial proceedings brought by
ratepayers.”).
350. Typically, only a legislature can extend such immunity. To the extent that state regulators
may have the authority to grant immunity by regulation, this would typically require some open and
transparent regulatory process in which noncustomers can participate, such as notice and comment
rulemaking. This is consistent with filed rate cases that view rates utilities filed with public utility
commissions as a form of legislation. See Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mugg, 202 U.S. 242, 245 (1906)
(“[W]hatever may be the rate agreed upon, the carrier’s lien on the goods is, by force of the act of
Congress, for the amount fixed by the published schedule of rates and charges . . . .”).
351. See supra notes 339–41 and accompanying text.
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doctrine as a basis for dismissing suits.352 However, absent some clear legislative
decision to limit utility liability, courts should not take such an approach in
considering private torts for climate adaptation risks. Our assessment of the
functional goals of the duty to adapt would suggest that a filed rate defense to
a private tort is only appropriate where a regulator has the authority and
institutional capacity to provide a remedy for harms associated with adaptation
risks on its own.353 If, however, a utility regulator only has limited authority to
set prices and to provide for customer refunds—as is often the case with state
energy price and planning regulation—the filed rate defense should not
generally be allowed to limit judicial consideration of a tort claim.354
Finally, the rationale for using a filed rate defense as a shorthand basis for
deferring to regulators on the grounds that adjudicating common law claims is
outside the wheelhouse of courts355 seems specious too, especially to the extent
that the risks, wrongs, and remedies addressed by the duty to adapt are outside
the jurisdiction of regulators. Even where regulators do have some jurisdiction
to address these risks, wrongs, and remedies, as we argue above, judicial
consideration of the duty to adapt can still provide substantial benefits to help
improve the regulatory process.356 At minimum, such concerns should only
emerge in cases where a utility regulator has, with some recency and specificity,
actually considered the climate concerns central to the duty to adapt.
That duty-to-adapt claims can involve complex factual issues related to
predictive forecasting and utility regulation should likewise not present a bar to
litigation. These issues are no more difficult to address than the tort claims
involving industries that courts routinely entertain.357 This does not require
courts to meddle in the regulatory process in a way that second-guesses the
decisions of regulators, though it does provide private remedies based on
standards for conduct that can improve future regulatory outcomes.

352. For discussion, see, for example, Rossi, Lowering the Filed Tariff Shield, supra note 346. See also
supra notes 348–49 and accompanying text.
353. See supra Section III.A.
354. Cf. Oncor Elec. Delivery Co. v. Chaparral Energy, LLC, 546 S.W.3d 133, 138 (Tex. 2018)
(observing that a “pervasive regulatory scheme” is not based on the mere fact of some regulatory power
but must give regulators the “means of remedying the problem”); id. at 143 (suggesting an “inadequateremedy” exception to the application of administrative exhaustion and the filed rate doctrine).
355. Hoffman v. N. States Power Co., 764 N.W.2d 34, 47 (Minn. 2009) (noting “[t]he judiciary
is not competent to engage in rate analysis” as one reason for applying the filed rate doctrine as a
defense to common law claims).
356. See supra Section III.A.
357. See, e.g., Lytton, supra note 3, at 1849 (making an analogy to torts against the gun industry
and the clergy). To the extent it focuses on the ongoing risks of harm associated with specific
infrastructure, a duty-to-adapt claim probably involves even more focused factual questions than some
of these kinds of cases, perhaps making it more akin to traditional product liability claims.
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CONCLUSION
We have made a historical, evidentiary, and normative case for general
judicial recognition of a negligence-based tort duty to adapt, extending the
traditional duty to serve to obligate public utilities to make operational and
planning decisions in a manner that accounts for changing conditions in light
of climate change. Negligence claims based on a duty to adapt will inevitably
raise other legal issues that need to be resolved case by case, including breach,
causation, and damages. This Article does not purport to address these. Of
broader significance, by holding industry actors accountable for adaptation
risks, judicial recognition of a private duty to adapt will necessarily result in
cascading implications for the energy sector. We conclude here with some
general reflections on these implications.
First, the duty to adapt provides an opportunity for a new wave of climate
litigation narrower in scope and focus and without the complex causation and
scientific evidence issues that have been a central challenge for many highprofile climate change cases.358 To date, climate change litigation has relied on
a loose confederation of legal theories and rationales for liability. Litigation
based on the duty to adapt provides a distinct, new avenue for liability for
adaptation harms from the energy grid and recognizes a form of harm distinct
from many adjacent theories of climate litigation.359 Most high-profile climate
cases to date focus on climate mitigation,360 but the duty to adapt shifts the focus
from mitigation to adaptation risks. A duty to adapt for energy grid operators
thus portends a new wave of climate litigation that focuses primarily on past
harms to a discrete set of victims and wrongs without relying on complex
scientific evidence to establish causation and harm.
Second, a duty to adapt is best understood as an extension of the
longstanding and traditional common law utility duty to serve. While big
regulatory decisions about infrastructure only occur infrequently, the duty to
adapt allows courts to play an ongoing role in holding the industry to account.
This can generate useful information about rapidly changing understandings of
the climate adaptation risks related to the energy grid, as well as the feasibility
of various risk reduction measures. A duty to adapt is not a roving invitation
for tort juries to second-guess the judgments of regulators, but instead a way
358. See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text.
359. See Sabrina McCormick, Robert L. Glicksman, Samuel J. Simmens, LeRoy Paddock, Daniel
Kim & Brittany Whited, Strategies in and Outcomes of Climate Change Litigation in the United States, 8
NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 829, 829 (2018).
360. See, e.g., Joana Seltzer & Lisa C. Vanhala, Climate Change Litigation: A Review of Research on
Courts and Litigants in Climate Change Governance, WIRES CLIMATE CHANGE, 2019, at 1, 11 (noting
that most studies of high-profile climate litigation found that such cases address mitigation, not
adaptation or seeking remedies for climate-related loss and damage).
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for the judicial system to produce evidence and hold energy grid operators
accountable for adaptation harms on an ongoing basis where regulation fails to
do so. We would expect a private duty to adapt to play the most significant role
in jurisdictions that have no adaptation planning laws or regulations, or where
there is no evidence that a utility has considered a specific form of adaptation
that could mitigate harm at all. By contrast, where there is an up-to-date record
on which a regulator has affirmatively considered and rejected the exact
adaptation measures alleged to have caused harm, the duty to adapt would need
to cede to agency preemption. This approach fits squarely within the metes and
bounds generally afforded and required of courts, and the information
generated by courts adjudicating energy grid operator misconduct helps update
industry and regulator decisions related to the risk trade-offs associated with
legacy and new infrastructure. The duty to adapt also allows tort law to help
protect against abuses of the traditional duty to serve that can emerge when
utilities invoke it as a shield to limit their liability based on past regulatory
decisions.
Third, since the duty to adapt focuses primarily on remedying past harms,
it does not envision a court making decisions that have binding consequences
beyond providing money damages for tort losses. We do not envision that a
court applying the duty to adapt would use injunctive relief or mandate wholly
new infrastructure expenditures in order to hold a negligent energy grid
operator accountable. Rather, as in other tort cases, a court would make a narrow
finding of unreasonable conduct under the circumstances, affording a harmed
plaintiff compensation for its loss. If a defendant is found liable, it would be
responsible to provide compensation for the plaintiff’s harm, but it is not
required to make a specific investment of capital. A utility subjected to an
adverse tort judgment still needs to evaluate what its best course of action is to
address future adaptation risks—and there are numerous ways to address these
risks, such as changing customer communication and notice protocols, making
capital investments to harden the grid and promote reliability, investing in grid
resilience, or establishing compensation funds for future victims. Just as a
court’s tort judgment against a product manufacturer does not dictate a specific
safety design, energy grid operators subject to a duty to adapt are held
accountable for past losses but have flexibility in the future as to how they
approach adaptation risks. Importantly too, decisions about planning and
investment will still be overseen by regulators. For purposes of setting customer
rates, the reasonableness of specific infrastructure investments and the risks and
benefits they entail will vary across various geographic regions, and the ultimate
assessment of the prudency of future capital expenditures will involve the
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balancing of a number of factors that are better suited to regulators rather than
courts.361
If (as we hope) regulation evolves to become more comprehensive in
recognizing and rationalizing climate adaptation risks, a private duty to adapt
may no longer be necessary to provide for compensation and deterrence.
Indeed, viewed in one light, the private duty to adapt may ultimately be
designed to diminish over time, translated into regulatory standards of
resilience, just as the duty to serve incorporated early conceptions of reliability.
But until that happens, a private duty to adapt is an important piece of the
puzzle in holding the operators of energy infrastructure to account for the
impacts of climate change.

361. Regulators will also need to examine whether it is reasonable for customers or a utility’s
investors to absorb the costs of litigating for recovery for past adaptation harms. In the case of SDG&E,
utility regulators ultimately refused to approve cost recovery from ratepayers of a utility’s settlement
of tort claims with victims of the 2007 wildfires. See supra note 221.

